Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/439940
If the Arctic is to be Prime Minister Harper's legacy there is little concrete evidence that his ideas has been supported by concrete actions. Most of these programs have been delayed – in some cases repeatedly – and there is little reason to expect much action until after the 2015 federal election, which could result in new government priorities. The fact that the government cut $3 bil- lion from the 2014 Defence Budget is only proof that its Arctic strategy has also been deferred. Even with the current commitment for one Polar-class icebreak- er, six existing conventional icebreakers and six modest Arctic pa- trol ships, can Canada reasonably secure its interests, especially given Russian investment? In 2013, 13 ships passed through the Northwest Passage and that is only expected to increase. Al- though new regulations for ship design will come into effect in 2015 to mitigate against environmental disasters in Arctic pas- sage, can Canada enforce those rules without more icebreakers? Do we risk losing control of our shipping lanes? By comparison Russia is undergoing a renaissance in nuclear vessel construction with four new nuclear icebreakers – the big- gest ever – joining the seven already used to guide cargo ships through the Northern Passage. Russia has also completed its first ice-capable nuclear oil/gas drilling platform – with a second in progress and six more being planned. In 2013, it launched two large barges with 20-tonne floating nuclear power stations to sup- port Russia's Arctic oil, gas and mining operations. And it is intro- ducing a new fleet of Borei-class nuclear missile submarines while still operating the older Delta-class subs that frequently crisscross under the Arctic ice. The Canadian government appears to believe our Arctic sover- eignty can be guarded by the six new Harry DeWolf-class AOPS (originally eight, but cut back due to budget creep). The fleet has been a high priority naval building program, but many experts see the AOPS as only having a nominal role in the Arctic – mostly during the ice-free summer months. Their design is based on the 85 metre-long, 6,100 tonne Svalbard Class Ocean Patrol Ship built by Tangsten Verf in Kragerø, Norway, the Norwegian Na- vy's largest warship with a proven record of breaking one-meter thick new ice. Canada, however, will build a slimmer version at least 1,000 tonnes lighter and perhaps challenged in one-metre new ice. And while this program has been a government priority, it is not necessarily the Royal Canadian Navy's. The RCN feels that these vessels are neither icebreakers nor adequate as a surface combatant and therefore an unnecessary diversion from their main missions. Between their cost and capability, would it be better investing in more Polar-class icebreakers? Canadian Arctic policy has been insufficient to prove our UNCLOS claim (at least to the Prime Minister's satisfaction). Without more investment, will we be able to protect our interests? A ARCTIC 16 dECEMBER 2014/JanUaRy 2015 www.vanguardcanada.com The fleet has been a high priority naval building program, but many experts see the AOPS as only having a nominal role in the Arctic. three armed, heavy icebreakers and a military port. However, the difference between the implementation of Russia's Arctic strategy and the still mostly posturing by Canada shows the classic differ- ence between actions and words. The Canadian commitment The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy carried over a number of programs from previous administrations, unfulfilled promises that represent both modernization of the Canadian military and new capability to address significant security concerns in the Arctic: • Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR): A plan to replace ageing C-130 Hercules and Buffalos first proposed in 2003, the project has produced a draft RFP but is still awaiting a final re- quest for bids. • Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft (CMA): First considered in 2003, it was announced in the CFDS as a priority for delivery in 2020; continued structural upgrades to more of the CP-140 Aurora fleet (now at 14) have likely pushed that out even further. • Joint Unmanned Surveillance Target Acquisition System (JUS- TAS): Once listed as a priority in the Conservative's election platform in 2005, it is still in options analysis. • Canadian Space Surveillance System (Sapphire): A program ini- tiated in 2000, with a planned launch in 2009-10, it was finally launched in February 2013. • Protected Military Satellite Communications (PMSC): Initiated in 1988, with phase one funded in 1999, it was launched in 2010. • Victoria-Class Upgrade: After a failed nuclear submarine re- placement in 1988-1991, modernization of four Upholder-class conventional submarines acquired in 1998 has finally reached a steady state, but may be insufficient for persistent Arctic patrol which will require modern nuclear submarines to be effective. Of the six programs, only the space surveillance and communica- tions satellites have been successfully completed. But they allow Canada to watch the Arctic, not to intervene. In its 2005 election platform, the Conservative Party announced several additional programs that will affect Arctic capability: • F-35A Joint Strike Fighter: Initiated by a MOU in 2001 and suspended in 2012 following an Auditor General's report, a program to replace Canada's fleet of CF-18 aircraft is now awaiting a Cabinet decision. • Polar-class icebreakers: What began as three icebreakers ex- pected to be in service by 2017 has been reduced to just one, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, now expect to join the fleet in 2021-2022 or later. • Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS): Officially announced in 2007, these six ships became part of the National Shipbuild- ing Procurement Strategy in 2010 and will begin cutting steel in 2015. • Joint Support Ship: First announced in 2006 and then cancelled in 2010 for non-compliant bids, the project will deliver three ships with reinforced hulls to support both the modernized frig- ates and the AOPS in the Arctic, likely around 2020. • Nanisivik Naval Base: A priority when announced as a new mili- tary/civilian deepwater harbour, it is unlikely to be completed until at least 2018, and probably on a smaller scale.