Vanguard Magazine

The last twenty years have seen important defence acquisitions delayed, sometimes for decades. There are various explanations, but the two leading causes are budgetary limitations and the over-specification of acquisition projects. Each of these factors can cause significant delays; it is when the two combine that we see the worst failures of the acquisition system. I IDEAS www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2015 35 D uring the era of Prime Min- ister Brian Mulroney, 1992 would see the launch of the Afloat Logistics Sealift Ca- pability (ALSC) program. ALSC was a rather modest program, with the aim of replacing Canada's aging naval oilers (AOR's) with new vessels. Those new vessels would combine the function of the AOR with a Roll-On/Roll-Off sealift ca- pability. The program would later change its name to Joint Support Ship (JSS) and proposed capabilities would start to bal- loon. By the time the program collapsed under the weight of its own expectations, the new requirements had driven costs into the stratosphere. The name remained the same, but the new vessels lacked many of the features once considered important. Overly demanding specifications delayed a critical acquisition and resulted in cost creep that endangered a program. It need not have happened. Attributed to Voltaire, "The perfect is the enemy of the good" is an aphorism that describes a principle known since the time of Confucius, if not longer. Achieving perfection is expensive in both time and money, sometimes far too expensive. The Golden Mean suggests to us that the last 20% of capability costs 80% of the effort and money. To put it simply, a 100% perfect match to desired capability can cost as much as five times the price of an 80% match. If that cost increase results in the cancellation of a program, the cost has been infinitely more expensive. Assets not yet in service do not perform tasks better than those that are currently available. We need to aim for 80%, but allow space for growth. The resulting acquisition may not be perfect, but it is in inventory. Using the Golden Mean does not mean sacrificing basic capability or utility. It does mean that specifications must focus on only essential core capabilities. In the case of the ALSC, this would have meant not adding in the command and full-scale replenishment capabilities that caused costs to balloon. MIL Systems proposed To put it simply, a 100% perfect match to desired capability can cost as much as five times the price of an 80% match. The author argues that Canada's Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship design is an ex- ample of the government's willingness to accept compromises to save money. The vessel will be able to perform many different roles, yet it may not be exceptional in any one of them. Credit: navy-marine.forces.gc.ca The initial program to replace Canada's aging supply ships, proposed under the Mulroney government, was the Afloat Logistics Seali Capability (ALSC) program. One of the ship designs submitted under ALSC was "SMART" (Strategic Multirole Aid and Replen- ishment Transport). In addition to a roll-on/roll-off cargo deck, it was also equipped to carry Mexeflote: modular, shallow dra pontoons capable of car- rying heavy equipment.

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