Vanguard Magazine

T THe lasT WORd "We will not be announcing a new cost estimate for the Canadian Surface Combatant until we have signed a build contract. Given the number of variables that can change and the very long plan- ning periods involved, we have seen how these estimates cause confusion," Minister of Public Service and Procurement Jody Foote told her audience of military officials and defence industry contractors at the recent Cansec 2016 conference. And you could almost feel the frustration in her voice. After all, there's not much fun in inheriting a maritime procurement pro- gram that is continually lambasted in the media for grossly going over budget, even before a single ship could be delivered. The CSC is a substantial part of Canada's National Shipbuild- ing Procurement Strategy, a program initiated by the Conserva- tive government that seeks to rebuild Canada's naval capability in what has been billed the country's largest procurement initiative since the Second World War. Under the CSC, the navy intends to replace its Halifax-class frigates and Iroquois-class destroyers with up to 15 ships by the mid-2020s. The CSC was initially estimated to cost $26 billion, plus an es- timated $14.7 billion to cover additional operational and sustain- ment expenses. Vice-Admiral Mark Norman has confirmed the actual program cost could shoot up to $30 billion. Design for the replacement ships was initially slated to be deliv- ered this year. However, due to numerous reasons, the PWSGSC now "expects to have a combat systems integrator and a warship designer by early 2017." This raises some concern as to whether the original delivery dates could be met. This is particularly troubling because it there is the matter of the question of what the condition of Canada's existing frigate fleet would be by the time the replacements are ready. The Iroquois-class destroyers have already been retired and the Halifax-class frigates are still in the water, but nearing the same situation. The frigates, which entered into service beginning in 1992, have a life expectancy that is estimated to end between 2027 and 2031. This would put the Halifax-class vessels roughly close to the age of the Iroquois-class when it was retired. If the CSC encounters any serious delays, there would be some challenges with keeping the frigates seaworthy. This leaves the government with two options, according to a re- cent article by Stewart Webb and Chris Murray for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. One is to delay the Halifax-class retirement. In which case, the navy will have to "revisit the issue of hull maintenance," the au- thors wrote in their article "Canada's hidden plan for predicted failure: Planning for the introduction of the Canadian Surface Combatant." "If they intend to extend the Halifax-class retirement timeline, there is a very real danger that we could be left with a nasty sur- prise concerning these 'neglected' hulls," the authors said. The other option is to keep the CSC program on track. This option could mean "constructing one destroyer and one frigate variant alternatively, which would be more costly and logis- tically challenging for the construction process but would ensure that when the class face retirement in the early 2030s, the RCN has not only received the destroyer variant and has all of their operational capabilities maintained, even if at lower numbers for a temporary period," according to Webb and Murray. They also made the following recommendations: • Assess the longevity of the Halifax-class fleet and whether indi- vidual DAG programs are appropriate, necessary and required given their current projected life-cycle; • Consider officially extending the life-cycle of the Halifax-class and the appropriate measures required, such as adopting DAG 2015 initiatives and developing a strategy to address the poten- tial hull concerns that would arise from the is extension; • Alternatively, if the Halifax-class frigates are to be retired as scheduled, they should be fitted with the bare-bones essentials and the focus should be kept on the building and introduction of the Canadian Surface Combatant fleet; • New appraisal of the NSPS that will take into consideration po- tential delays and foreseeable cost overruns, such as projected military-related inflation; • Reconsider the CSC construction strategy to reflect an alternate schedule of the two variants to ensure that overall operational capability. In their assessment of the CSC, Webb and Murray stated that communication and the procurement process has broken down. "The left hand is not talking to the right hand," they said. "An initiative must be formulated and taken with immediate effect to correct this dysfunctional lack of communication, to ensure that throughout the future of the NSPS there are not further mistakes of this kind taken, some of which could prove to be far more costly and even dire than that reflected within the DAG 2015. The government clearly must get a handle and demonstrate active and clear leadership on these issues." by nestor arellano tHe liberal's two options For steering tHe CsC 46 JUNe/JULY 2016 www.vanguardcanada.com Photo by: Private Martin Roy

• Cover