Vanguard Magazine

deFence POLICY www.vanguardcanada.com AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2016 21 d force was deploying with the full suite of capabilities required to enforce the mili- tary provisions of the peace agreement – it was a credible force with no gaps in capa- bility. And, NATO militaries were profes- sionals, coming with the authority to use force, and the will to use force where re- quired, and thus credible in their capacity and willingness to use force where neces- sary. The result was a peaceful and compli- ant transition by warring factions into their cantonment sites – no shots needing to be fired and no further loss of life. The man- date, the force's capabilities, and its will to use force as necessary were complete – it was relevant to the challenge and credible to all factions – and the mission was able to progress while the security of deployed forces was dramatically enhanced. Canadian troops exchanged blue berets for green helmets. Canada deployed a com- bat capable force with its full complement of close combat capabilities. The Canadian forces were integrated with NATO and whole-of-government partners in a more comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The force didn't have to fire a shot but was absolutely equipped and prepared to do battle, aggressively, ef- fectively and decisively, and former adver- saries knew it. And Canada's contribution went from being inconsequential to the lives of the people in the region, to a real source of security and opportunity in their post-civil-war journey. having real options and choices Canada's geography and privileged stra- tegic position in terms of relationships, in particular with the United States, do allow the government the privilege of choice and discretion in international interventions. Still, governments have had a broad ver- sus a narrow range of options available to them in these interventions – and citizens have been supportive when they see this. For options to be real, they need to pre- exist any particular crisis, and be within the Canadian military baseline, both Regular and Reserve forces, and the institution's short-term potential for adaptation and expansion. New capabilities for high-risk operations cannot be manufactured and brought to bear at the speed with which crises occur and effective responses are re- quired. If capabilities are to be considered real options for either missions of necessity or discretion, they need to be real and in existence, not imagined. In conflicts and crises where threats, enemies and adversaries must be engaged persistently and directly, to preserve lives and protect people where they live, de- ployment onto and engagement in the land domain must be an option available to Canada and Canadians. Land forces – with the Canadian Army at the centre – must be capable, confident and credible in conflict, up to and including combat. Gen- eral-purpose combat capability remains the key to the confidence of Canada's own forces to endure the danger, complexity and uncertainty of interventions, and to their confidence and capacity to bring to bear effects and influences that achieve results in contested and conflicted zones abroad. General-purpose combat capabil- ity remains key to the credibility of Cana- dian forces in conflict zones, to partners alongside whom troops must operate and fight, and to the protection that credibility affords to troops. Full spectrum, general-purpose, combat-capable General-purpose combat capability and credibility do not come to a force through subcontracting key core components. Nor does it imply 'owning' the full suite of ca- pacities within each capability area. While much can be provided by others, their of- ferings need to nest and integrate within one's own force, on top of one's own ca- pacities. Own capabilities at the tactical level can be complemented, but not en- tirely replaced by another force, in particu- lar those functions that will always remain at the centre of general-purpose combat capacities and those enabling enduring na- tional responsibility. These five core capabilities remain: • the ability to lead one's own forces, in- tegrate the capabilities of other forces, and work effectively alongside indig- enous and whole-of-government part- ners (Command); • the ability to see with one's own sen- sors in the visible, electro-magnetic and cyber spectrums, and to contribute and draw on partners' abilities to see (Sense); • the capacity to apply force up to and including lethal force – broadly or with precision – to influence an adversary's actions, and defeat it in combat through fires and manoeuvre when needed (Act); • the ability to protect and preserve the lives and limbs of one's own troops, from airborne threats, improvised ex- plosive devices (IEDs), direct and indi- rect fire weapons, chemical, biological and radiological threats, and health risks (Shield); • and finally the ability to sustain all of these with supply, transportation, main- tenance, logistics, and financial services (Sustain) – the whole array of back of- fice functions that, as Napoleon put it, professionals talk about. The Canadian Army, and a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) generated larger joint force, must provide all of these as capabilities that are core to a general-pur- pose force, and essential to combat capa- bility. These core elements are key to be- ing able to integrate capabilities provided by partners, and those offered as contri- butions to mission partners. Full spectrum operations – from peace to war – are a team effort, and the CAF need to bring to bear all the pieces that contribute to teams and that leverage contributions of others, while commanding, shielding and sustain- ing Canadian forces on the ground. At home, demonstrating presence, en- forcing sovereignty, reinforcing and sup- porting domestic security forces, and responding to crises resulting from man- made and natural disasters, require mass.2 Typically, close combat forces of Regular and Reserve components are re-rolled to perform people-based security and gen- eral duty tasks (infantry, armour, artillery troops (Act functions) for example). The balance of the land force (again Regular and Reserve) enables the command, sense, sustain and shield functions – even provid- ing those services to citizens and public safety organizations – from surveillance to communications, to logistics, to health services. General-purpose capabilities al-

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