Vanguard Magazine

The security environment has changed beyond all recognition for the worse since 2008. 38 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2016 www.vanguardcanada.com D Defence stabilizing and securing the world of the 21st century. That world will be secured by a mix of hard and soft power. There is no doubt that Canada's excellence in combining de- fence, diplomacy and development (what the Dutch call the 3Ds) acts as a beacon of security sophistication in a complex world resistant to fast and too often loose hard power prescriptions. Indeed, Canada's championing of such sophistication helps invest the 3Ds with strategic legitimacy, not least in Washington. However, Canada is also at the heart of new/old communities and groupings vi- tal to 21st century security in which many flags and identities will be needed across hard power alliances and coalitions. Such communities include the United Nations and its regional agencies, the Common- wealth, and on occasion the Anglosphere. Indeed, the latter two became more im- portant with Britain's decision to leave the European Union. However, Canada's soft power cannot be leveraged if Ottawa in- vests insufficiently in the CAF. Indeed, the impact of the former depends to a signifi- cant extent on the credibility of the latter. As an institution of democracies, NATO legitimizes and embeds armed force within an institutional framework that helps pre- vent extreme state behaviour, both in Eu- rope and beyond. This is a critical Canadian interest. Moreover, the legitimate future use of armed force will demand new defence architectures that merge use of advanced expeditionary forces with cyber and missile defence, deep penetration intelligence, and anti-access, area-denial capabilities. Such capabilities will in turn demand a strategic unity of purpose and effort of military capacity and sufficient capabil- ity that such forces are credible across a spectrum from peace support through hybrid warfare to deterrence and, if needs be, warfighting. Above all, they must be able to work together (interoperability). The development and aggregation of such force will only be possible through NATO. Moreover, NATO will also act as a critical coalition enabler providing the force generation and command and con- trol standards for allies and partners alike to work together against such adversaries as IS/Daesh. Canada must not be left be- hind! What is canada doing? The CFDS states that the Canadian Armed Forces must defend Canadians and Canadi- an sovereignty, contribute to the defence of North America with the United States, and contribute to international peace and secu- rity. The core missions set by CFDS which are reliant on the strategic context include, inter alia: daily domestic and continental missions, including the Arctic and through NORAD; response to a major terrorist at- tack; support for civil authority during cri- ses in Canada; lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended pe- riod; and deploy forces worldwide as part of crisis response for shorter periods. Sustained operations in Afghanistan re- vealed the gap between Canadian rhetoric and reality. CAF suffered from a lack of combat ready personnel and a lack of spe- cialized equipment and personnel, the need for which put pressure on allies, most no- tably the Americans. The conduct of the campaign also reinforced a simple Canadian strategic truism − unless Canada wishes to become an isolationist power, the utility of allies and partners to the fulfilment of Cana- dian security and defence objectives is vital. And yet, according to the CIA World Factbook in 2015 Canada spent only 1.24 per cent of its $1.7 trillion economy on defence. Given the deteriorating strategic context of the global security environment it is hard to see how such a low level of de- fence expenditure can be reconciled with the roles and missions of the CAF as stated in the CFDS, let alone future operations. What should canada do? Canada is a signatory of the 2014 NATO Wales Summit Declaration which states: Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent of defence is below this level [2 per cent GDP on defence of which 20 per cent must be spent on new equipment] will: halt any decline in defence expenditure; aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows; aim to move towards the 2 per cent guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capa- bility Targets and filling NATO's capabil- ity shortfalls. There must be no more delusional talk from senior Canadians about how Ottawa can justify 1.24 per cent GDP on defence because of better spending. Canada must move decisively towards 2 per cent of GDP on defence or risk weakening NATO and free-riding on a resentful and over- stretched United States. How can Canada do this? Leadership! The CAF have suffered disproportionately from budget reduction efforts. However, given the growth of defence budgets else- where in the world, given the dangers faced by the alliance, and given Canada's unfor- giving strategic environment, Ottawa must take a lead in reinvesting in the CAF. Not only will such a reinvestment help to anchor both NATO and the wider the transatlantic strategic relationship in reality, it will also underpin Canada's range of security tools with hard-edged military capability. The NATO 2 per cent-guideline is in fact only a baseline. Canada also needs to con- tinue to reform the CAF into a deep joint force by placing the 2015 Canadian Joint Operation Command right at the core of the CAF force concept. This is precisely what the British did in the November 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) with the Joint Force Command (JFC). How much will it cost? Over a decade Canada will need to move from spending roughly CDN $18 billion per annum on defence. A graduated increase to 2 per cent GDP would see Canada spending CDN $34 billion by 2025. Making canada's role in nATO more effective Respected Canadian academic Alexander Moens writes, "Canada cannot simply go the way of specialization in terms of mili- tary capabilities. Even if niche capabilities may be sufficient in very few cases, the bulk of Canadian defence must remain based on broad defence capabilities and a wide range of action." Canada is a hugely respected member of NATO and the wider international community. However, the CAF are too weak to serve Canada's vital security and defence interests, for Ottawa to play the full role in the international community to which Canada aspires to play, and to make NATO work. To fill that gap Canada must rely on the strategic lar- gesse of others. Canada must not become a free-rider! It is not the Canadian way! Professor Julian Lindley-french is Vice- President of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Brussels, Senior Fellow of the Institute for Statecra in London, Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University in Washington DC, and a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

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