Vanguard Magazine

deFence POLICY 20 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2016 www.vanguardcanada.com The government will continue to need the Canadian Army to meet the no-fail safety and security missions at home, as well as abroad. d and cyber for certain. Where and when it matters the most ultimately this means by physically deploying on the ground, amongst populations, and in the full face of manmade threats or natural disasters. This means by bringing to bear force and forces – on the ground. The strategic utility of land forces and land operations in the safety and security of Canadians at home, and in the fight for and pursuit of peace and stability abroad, will endure. Any assessment of the future security environment calls for the govern- ment to have the option to augment civil authorities at home with land capabilities and capacities, to demonstrate presence and sovereignty through persistent pres- ence in all corners of Canadian territory, and to respond to crises abroad through di- saster response and relief, conflict preven- tion, security assistance, capacity building, peace enforcement and, where needed, the application of force, including lethal force, to defeat threats and adversaries in com- bat. This last feature of the utility of force in today's security environment, and the security environment of the future, cannot be understated. Violence and volatility are on the rise. Instability and uncertainty are on the rise. State actors with peer to West- ern military power are increasingly aggres- sive and sophisticated in the use of force and forces in their near abroad. Violent and extremist terrorist groups continue to traumatize populations and increase their territorial influence. Where and when it is in the national interest to intervene – to prevent aggression, respond to aggression, or to defeat aggressors – a whole range of military capabilities and capacities need to be available, in particular those able to exercise force, and to coordinate, in in- creasingly sophisticated ways, the threat or application of force. This means, in short, combat capability. The government will continue to need the Canadian Army to meet the no-fail safety and security missions at home, the combined Canadian and US responses for defence of the continent, including in the Arctic, as well as the projection of land power to and application of land power in conflicts abroad. That strategic utility cannot be realized, however, unless the missions and mandates assigned, and the qualities and capabilities of that land pow- er – generated predominantly by the Cana- dian Army – are real, relevant and credible. This point is key and worth discussing. relevance and credibility In the fall of 1995, Canada was embroiled in its third year of the Balkan crisis. Canada had – between troops deployed in Croatia and Bosnia, maritime forces in the Adri- atic, and air forces based in Italy – over 3,500 uniformed men and women fully engaged. They were operating alongside 38,000 international military partners in the so-called United Nations (UN) Pro- tection Force (UNPROFOR) seeking to 'keep the peace' in the midst of the civil war there. There was no peace to keep. The Serb-led massacre at Srebrenica, viola- tion of 'safe areas' in Gorazde, the assault by Croatian forces through Canadian pro- tected areas in Croatia's sector south, and the hostage-taking of unarmed observers – including a Canadian Military Observer chained to a bridge – typified our experi- ence on the ground and the images shared with the world. Rules of engagement pro- hibited troops from using force for any- thing more than selfdefence. They were powerless in the face of violence by the factions against civilian populations, with huge consequences to the people, as well as to the mental health and well-being of participating troops. These typified Can- ada's experiences during the dark days of that UN intervention. The international approach taken in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and the choices taken in Canada and international- ly on the utility of force in this crisis, led to a failed mission. On a good day, UN forces were an inconvenience to, or ignored by, the warring factions. On a bad day, they were pawns and hostages in their great game, and witnesses to the atrocities they inflicted on each other and their peoples. UNPROFOR, thankfully, wasn't to be the end of our pursuit for peace in that theatre of conflict. Eventually the UN, warring factions, and the world tired of this condi- tion. In late 1995, a new framework for intervention was implemented – under a UN Chapter 7 mandate – with a clear dip- lomatic lead, and a capable military force under NATO was ordered into action, and a new era in the crises intervention came into play. As the UN mission was concluding and conditions for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) engagement were being prepared in conference rooms and embassies elsewhere, things started to change dramatically on the ground. Longstanding adversaries and combatants gradually and then dramatically reduced their combativeness, increased their level of compliance with old agreements and accords, and, in very real ways, started treating the UN military forces in Bosnia with an unseen-before degree of civil- ity and cooperation. From blocking UN movements, confiscating equipment and material, and threatening personal vio- lence, the military leadership of factions almost became friendly. Why? When asked that question late in November 1995, one Bosnian Serb Colonel replied, "NATO is coming, NATO are warfighters, we aren't going to fight NATO." That man's words communicated a few simple messages. The UN mandate and military mission were not relevant to or credible in the face of the civil war. Forc- es were neither equipped nor credible as professionals. And, UN forces had neither the authority nor the will to use force to make a difference. UN forces were neither relevant to the crises nor credible to the factions, and were powerless and suffered because of this. On the coming NATO force, however, this Colonel's message was the opposite. The NATO mission was seen as relevant to and credible in the context of the conflict of the day – there were no holes in the mandate. The NATO

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