Vanguard Magazine

18 DECEMBER 2016/JANUARY 2017 www.vanguardcanada.com PeaceKeePIng P civilian personnel, and this boils down to deployment experience. Deployments, among other things, help identify the personnel who cannot manage the stress of operations and who may detract from mission successes. Only with real experience – rather than simulations and exercises – can successes be gained. For example, the United States has innovated its ability to gain relevant and timely deployment experience by running 'live exercises' during its humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations (HA/ DR) – a type of operation that requires a whole-of-government approach to succeed. If we are not doing Cyprus peacekeeping anymore, we certain- ly need to avoid doing the same type of peacekeeper training. Canada can apply innovative 'live exercising' to get on-the-job peacekeeping training. Deploying more Canadians on UN mis- sions means that they gain field experience within semi-permissive multidimensional environments and learn the lessons of interna- tional cross-cultural leadership, civil-military relations, communi- ty-based policing and security, and other innovative techniques that bring about lasting stability. It is recommended that the government deploy 1,000 contingent troops, police and civilian personnel per year to the UN peacekeeping missions that mat- ter to national security, and fall within its defence-related foreign policy aims. The cost of this increase would be approximately 10 times the current cost of the deployment of 100 personnel. Deployments should be short term (1 month), medium term (3 months) and long term (6 months to 1 year) to yield learning and innovation. It is recommended that the government engage existing defence lessons-learned capabilities to assess the experi- ence of troops, police and civilian personnel to increase knowl- edge acquisition within the relevant government departments and agencies. When the government of Canada decides to deploy the CAF to an existing or new UN peace operation, it must ensure the follow- ing pieces are in place: • A clear chain of command exists in theatre and with the CAF in Canada able to make decisive changes if the mission environ- ment deteriorates beyond the remit of the mission's mandate and Rules of Engagement. • If deploying under a Chapter 7 mandate, Canada must guarantee – or confirm allied protection through – combat heavy weapons support in theatre prior to the deployment of CAF capabilities, such as mobile medical teams, engineering support, civilian ex- perts, police and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), if its mandate is widened beyond disaster response. • The CAF, Canadian police and other deployed personnel foster relationships with reliable in-theatre partners in communica- tions, logistics and airlift in the nascent stages of Canada's own development in these support capabilities. • The rules of engagement (ROE) for each mission in which Ca- nadians are deployed are robust to allow for a full spectrum of use of force by the CAF against aggressors, whether aggressor violence is focused on the local civilian population, or the UN peacekeepers themselves. If the ROEs are not robust enough, Canadians should not deploy to the mission. Canada's bid to participate on the UN Security Council for two years starting in 2020 is a committed position to engage fully in multilateral efforts of the international system intended to net enhanced peace, security and stability dividends. While it is pursu- ing a seat, it is recommended that the government focus its ap- proach to conflict management by supporting innovative systems and processes that can be duplicated by other states and non-state actors, such as it did with the development of innovations like Re- sults-Based Management, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and Free Balance, to name a few. The remit for Global Affairs Canada (GAC) now has an economic lens, evidenced by the transforma- tion away from supporting 'dead aid,' which causes cyclical state- based welfare in developing states, towards investment aid, which ends the welfare cycle and creates autonomy in developing coun- tries, while having direct economic benefits for Canada's public and private sector contributions to global peace and security. UN peacekeeping contributions should be viewed with a similar lens - in that missions can be used to deploy more Canadians to reap the benefits of live whole-of-government exercises. Additionally, contributions should empower the development of innovations in the conflict management industry to improve the efficacy of peacekeeping while driving Canadian economies. While the Security Council seat would be advantageous for Canada, the government must concomitantly support UN peace- keeping by increasing deployments to missions, as well as drive public and private sector innovations for managing conflicts, all while capturing the relevant lessons to inform the government's understanding of the changing nature of the conflict environ- ment. It is recommended that the government establish a fiscal framework supporting peacekeeping training, deployments, les- sons learned and conflict management innovations that exceeds the existing budget for these existing capabilities by 10 per cent. This plan will yield the highest dividends for global peace and security which, in turn, underscores Canada's foreign policy in- terests. Working shoulder-to-shoulder with allies on UN peace operations permits Canada entry to the decision-making table re- garding international governance and collective security. dr. sarah Jane meharg is president of Peace & Conflict Planners Canada and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. She is Canada's leading post-conflict recon- struction expert and specializes in the research and implementation of advanced technologies for reconstruction initiatives. The patrol in port-au-prince, Haiti during operation HAMleT on September 13, 2013. photo: DnD

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