Vanguard Magazine

14 DECEMBER 2016/JANUARY 2017 www.vanguardcanada.com c cYBer WAR tions systems with the intent of threaten- ing a state's sovereignty. It also means try- ing to know everything about an adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about oneself. There are three forms of what have been called computer network operations: • Computer Network Attack: operations designed to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in comput- ers or computer networks, or the com- puters or networks themselves. • Computer Network Exploitation: re- trieving intelligence-grade data and in- formation from enemy computers by information and communications tech- nology (ICT). • Computer Network Defence: all mea- sures necessary to protect your own ICT and infrastructures from hostile comput- er network attack and computer network exploitation. Computer network attack is still in its infancy, but its importance has increased immensely since 2010 and it will certainly increase considerably in the coming years. Some people think that cyber war will sooner or later replace kinetic war. More frequently, cyber war is presented as a new kind of war that is cheaper, cleaner and less risky for an attacker than other forms of armed conflict. In either case, the Cana- dian Armed Forces have a responsibility not only to protect their own systems, but they also need to have the authority to di- rect offensive action, in the form of cyber attacks, if that is what it takes to blunt an ongoing catastrophic attack on critical in- frastructure at home. It would be neglect- ful beyond belief to leave the Canadian Armed Forces without access to offensive cyber capabilities and the requisite author- ity to attack a foreign adversary who is causing catastrophic damage to Canada's critical infrastructure through cyber war. Only then will the Canadian Armed Forc- es be relevant in future conflicts. This high priority responsibility and authority must be highlighted in the upcoming Defence Policy Review, thereby ensuring that it is adequately resourced forthwith. In that regard, it is noteworthy that in spite of days of contentious debate on the floor of the US Congress over the 2015 National Defence Authorization Act, there was a rare bipartisan consensus concerning cyber, and it was fully funded. Also wor- thy of note is the fact that in April 2015, the United States released a new Cyber Security Strategy. Among other things, for the first time, it explicitly discussed the cir- cumstances (see catastrophic attack above) under which cyber war could be used against an attacker. This is why asking the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces to work on the policy/legal framework in 2010 was wise – why and when is easily as important as how, and actually harder to nail down. … cyber war is presented as a new kind of war that is cheaper, cleaner and less risky than other forms of armed conflict Not least of the policy questions is how/ where capabilities should be developed and how/when accessed. If that's not clear, drumming up funding for weaponry development could be wasteful at best and disruptive or dangerous at worst. That work must be finalized, if it hasn't been al- ready, as part of the Defence Review. It will be an essential component to an update of Canada's 2010 Cyber Security Strategy, which will be an indispensable comple- ment to the Defence Policy Review. The clarification of Canada's approach to cyber as highlighted above, within the Defence Review, in combination with the updated Cyber Security Strategy, would form the basis for Canada/US discussions regarding a CANUS Cyber Accord. Bor- ders do not inhibit network warfare opera- tions. Furthermore, elements of Canada's critical infrastructure, currently vulnerable to cyber attack, are shared. Accordingly, such an accord makes eminent sense and would deepen Canada/US defence coop- eration. Finally, to highlight the priority that the United States is placing on this matter, there is draft legislation before Congress which seeks to improve the Pentagon's de- fence procurement process for cyber war- fare technologies by including these tech- nologies within the Secretary of Defense's Rapid Acquisition Authority. In conclusion, the time for the govern- ment of Canada, the Department of Na- tional Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces to close the shortfall in the author- ity to engage in cyber war is now, and the perfect vehicle is the Liberal government's recently announced Defence Review to be done in lockstep with an update of Cana- da's Cyber Security Strategy. Major-General John Adams (Ret'd) is the former Chief of the Communications Secu- rity Establishment Canada and Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence. Aer his retirement from the Canadian Forces, Adams was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Infrastructure, and Environment, for National Defence. From 1998 to 2003, he served as Assistant Deputy Minister, Marine Services and Commissioner with the Cana- dian Coast Guard for Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and from 2003 to June 2005, as Associate Deputy Minister and Commis- sioner of the Canadian Coast Guard.

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