Vanguard Magazine

D DEFENCE POLICY www.vanguardcanada.com AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2017 31 Canada back to devoting the same share of the economy to defence as we experienced between 1999 and 2006. While the new spending brought about by this policy is meaningful, it will return Canada to the same relative level of spending experienced in Canada after a decade of post-Cold War budget cuts were completed, and before the Martin and Harper governments start- ed a half decade of military reinvestment. Just as important as the size of cash in- jection is where it is directed. Most of the new funds are earmarked for new Capi- tal purchases. As the Minister of National Defence stated prior to the release of the new policy, a large list of Capital projects, including a number deemed critical, were unfunded when the Trudeau government formed government. On an accrual ac- counting basis, the new policy provides $33.8 billion in new Capital money (over the 20-year period) to fund 52 projects which previously had no funding at all. In addition, over the life of the policy, sig- nificant funds have been reallocated within the preexisting funding envelope to provide an additional $5.9 billion (on an accrual ba- sis) to bolster the budgets of a number of projects which already had funding, just not enough. The two biggest changes saw the budget for the Canadian Surface Combat- ant increase from $26.2 billion to between $56-60 billion and the Future Fighter Ca- pability Project which saw its budget raised from $9 billion to $15-19 billion. The increases were in part to accom- modate significant official changes to the planned combat fleets for the navy and air force. The policy stipulated that Canada's future navy will sail a fleet of 15 combat- ants, removing the previous ambiguity regarding how many could be obtained from a project mandated to acquire "up to 15" ships. Canada's fighter force also saw a significant change, as the planned acqui- sition of new jets has risen from a fleet of 65 to 88, to deliver on the government's policy change that Canada be able to si- multaneously meet both NORAD and NATO commitments concurrently. With respect to Capital investments, the other item of significance in the new policy is the statement that Joint C4ISR capabilities will be prioritized. While a number of such projects have been en- visioned for some time, progress on some seems to have been limited by the fact that as joint projects they often lack the same type of capability champion as the core projects for the other services. Indications from departmental officials' briefings on the new policy are that joint C4ISR projects will now receive dedicat- ed funding sources and priority access to DND project governance to ensure that they are actually treated as priorities. In addition to the substantive increase in Capital funding, the new policy also com- mits an additional $15.1 billion in operat- ing funding, roughly $9 billion of which tal, the new policy provides $62.3 billion over the next two decades on a cash basis. As a result of the increase, measured on a consistent basis, the share of Canada's Gross Domestic Product directed towards defence spending will rise from under 1 per cent to 1.2 per cent by 2024/2025. Under Canada's new method of calcula- tion, which NATO has already adopted in its reports on alliance defence spending, Canada's new defence budget math will see an additional 0.2 per cent of GDP included as defence spending, pushing our overall share to 1.4 per cent of GDP. These pre- viously unreported items include spending by other departments for such items as pay- ments to veterans, employee pension and benefits, the budget for the Communica- tion Security Establishment, Information Technology support provided to DND by Shared Services Canada, Coast Guard ice- breaking in support of naval operations – these expenditures will now be included in Canada's calculations for NATO. This effectively serves notice to NATO that Canada officially has no intention of ever reaching the alliance's 2 per cent of GDP spending target, nor even the com- mitment to produce a plan to do so by 2024. As a result of the new policy, the decline in the share of our economy de- voted to defence will stop, and a progres- sive increase of more than 20 per cent will occur over time. In historical context, if Canada is successful in spending 1.2 per cent of GDP on defence (using a consis- tent method of calculation) this will bring 5 Joint Capabilities Reinvesting in and Modernizing Core Capability 88 new advanced fighter aircraft Next generation multi-mission aircraft (CP-140 replacement) Next generation air-to-air tanker- transport Replace utility transport aircraft Range of remotely piloted systems Space capabilities (global satellite communications, surveillance of space, ISR) Light Forces Modernization LAV mobility and survivability Modernized logistics and heavy engineering vehicles; C-IED Replace armoured combat support vehicles Ground-based air defence Enhanced ability to operate in remote regions Arctic mobility enhancements 15 Canadian Surface Combatants 2 Joint Support Ships 5-6 Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships Modernized Victoria-class submarines Enhanced naval intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, upgraded armaments, systems for future platforms Special Operations Forces Next generation integrated soldier system, land and maritime mobility and fighting vehicle platforms Modernized C4 Airborne ISR platforms Recapitalize commercial pattern armoured vehicles Joint command and control systems and communications Joint signals intelligence Improved joint deployable HQ and signals regiment Improved crypto, info ops and cyber capabilities Improved Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive detection and response capabilities The new policy is underwritten by a new 20-year defence budget. As a result, there will be a modest annual increase in the defence budget of a few billion a year, but a significant injection of new funding on a cash expenditure basis. Source: National Defence

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