Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2017 15 suBmarIne s tween Halifax and Nanisivik is greater than Halifax to London, UK) demand an ocean-going - not coastal - capability with independence from supporting infra- structure and resupply. Simply put, when operating off Canada's coasts there is no quick port to nip into to resupply – it can be really quite austere. Today a modern conventional subma- rine is diesel-electric powered, with a prov- en technology that dates back a century. These air-breathing diesel engines gener- ate electricity that is stored in a large bat- tery. The battery then powers everything in the submarine from propulsion to the galley. Recently, some nations have add- ed non-nuclear Air-Independent Power (AIP) generation with which to conduct prolonged submerged operations (limited by AIP fuel) as an adjunct, (not a replace- ment) to traditional diesel-electric power. These different forms of non-nuclear AIP, all of which require additional types of fuel to operate, are almost all exclusively developed by and for European nations with different submarine operating areas than Canada. Notably, they are all much closer to sources of resupply than a Cana- dian submarine conducting domestic op- erations can ever hope to enjoy. Moreover, these systems are not powerful enough to generate and clear the atmosphere of the submarine should there be a fire and therefore, at their current level of technol- ogy, are unsuitable for prolonged under- ice operations. A modern conventional submarine de- signed today would see a continued refine- ment of diesel generation technology with greater power and fuel efficiency, accom- panied by better battery technology, such as lithium. This would allow for increased energy storage capacity, as well as a po- tential for augmentation of an AIP source for limited submerged power generation. Technologically this represents the status quo, which poses a dilemma for Canadian submarine designers trying to push an ocean-going submarine for long distances and potentially under the ice. unconventional - conventional submarine In short, Canada needs someone to go away and develop a technology that will mirror nuclear propulsion, but not be nuclear – this will require a significant fi- nancial investment. As the major navies in the world have already invested in expen- sive nuclear propulsion infrastructure (US, UK, France, Russia, China & India) there can be no expectation of the sort of tech- nological investment required to meet this challenge to come from these nations. Thus, one needs to look to industry for a solution, and fortuitously, the push for more environmentally acceptable alterna- tives to fossil fuels that have caused a tech- nological revolution in power, particularly in battery technology. From the subma- rine perspective, is this technology there today? No, not yet; but given time it will undoubtedly reap rewards and significant- ly alter the design of future conventional submarines. Therefore, if Canada is to obtain the submarine it requires without embarking on huge technological invest- ment, it needs time for industry to develop the solution. Hence the reason the Victo- ria-class Modernization (VCM) project is important, it will buy Canada the time necessary to leverage nascent technologies to obtain the submarine Canada needs or, in other words, the 'Unconventional- Conventional Submarine'. It is generally understood that the deep maintenance that each Victoria-class sub- marine undergoes every few years ensures their material safety. While such mainte- nance will ensure their technical viability into the 2030s, it is the investment un- derpinned by the Victoria-Class Modern- ization project, which will keep their op- erational effectiveness in line with evolving RCN requirements over their extended life. While the project is looking at a num- ber of capability issues, it must address two key areas: 1. Support to joint operations ashore. This has always been a traditional submarine mission set and Canada needs to fur- ther exploit the inherent flexibility of a conventional submarine in the conduct of operations in the shallow and con- gested waters of the littoral; particularly in support of Special Forces. 2. Operations in the Arctic. The require- ment to be able to operate in the Arctic is well recognized and, as pre- viously discussed, there are some sig- nificant challenges to achieving more than seasonal ice edge forays when operating non-nuclear powered sub- marines. This is a tough order, which has the potential to realize meaningful improvement over current capabilities. It is also a very necessary catalyst to push the type of submarine technolo- gies that will be considered in a future submarine replacement programme. To answer the question does this Uncon- ventional-Conventional Submarine exist? The answer is no, not yet, but it could be in the near future. If it could be, the question becomes who could design and build this submarine? As Canadians are now seeing with the National Shipbuilding Strategy, a shipbuilding capability takes time to build, but submarine construction is necessarily different and more complicated to that of surface ships, including complex warships such as the future Canadian Surface Com- batant (CSC) project. Can Canada build a conventional submarine? Yes, but… The last time Canada built submarines was during the First World War for Brit- ain. That said, Canadian manufacturers in the Montreal area have and continue to construct elements of modern US nuclear- powered submarines, which includes the ability to cold roll High Yield steel. Mean- while, the nucleus of a submarine build capability may be resident in Canada, the bigger question becomes would it be eco- nomically feasible? That would, of course, depend on a number of factors – most im- portantly the total numbers of submarines to be built. There is an argument that with the assistance of an experienced submarine shipbuilder, Canada can procure a fleet of 12 modern AIP equipped submarines, as recommended by the recent Senate Report on National Security and Defence. The question becomes who are these experi- enced submarine designers/builders and can they do it? possible options Assuming that neither a Russian nor a Chinese designer/builder would be ac- ceptable for national security reasons and understanding that India's submarine con- struction capacity is embryonic, this leaves the following possibilities with the caveats Canada needs someone to go away and develop a technology that will mirror nuclear propulsion, but not be nuclear – this will require a significant financial investment.

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