Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com DECEMBER 2017/JANUARY 2018 31 cybersecurity Canadian jurisdictions accept an assort- ment of identification, the vast majority of which do not prove citizenship. In fed- eral elections, the voters list is updated from income tax return information, and identifies most eligible voters. Exception processes are in place to avoid denying citizens the right to vote. These processes can be described, at best, as somewhat accurate. The primary security control is that, if a large number of people not on the voters lists appear, both election poll staff and scrutineers are likely to take notice. While it is possible that the occasional eligible voter could be denied the opportunity to vote, it is more likely that an ineligible person may be al- lowed to vote. Adjusting the identifica- tion rules is itself highly political; certain candidates may benefit from stricter or looser identification rules. Federal legisla- tion which was tabled last year proposed seven changes to the Canadian electoral system. The bill intends to increase voter participation while enhancing the integ- rity of federal elections. The act of voting is also problematic from a security perspective. The goal is to capture the true intent of the voter, but any system can result in errors. Electronic voting machines could suffer from integ- rity issues, or the voter might just press the wrong button. Counting machines, such as those used in City of Ottawa mu- nicipal elections, read the voter's bubble sheet in front of them, and immediately indicate if an error is detected. In the ab- sence of a display, there is no way for the voter to know, with confidence, that their vote was read correctly. In federal elections, Canadians are currently asked to place a mark in the circle beside the name of the person for whom they wish to vote. While a small number of individuals intentionally spoil their ballot by writing messages on it, it is astounding how many people have difficulty following the simple instruc- tions, perhaps due to language or cultural barriers. When the ballots are manu- ally counted, poll workers, monitored by candidate representatives (also known as scrutineers), are tasked with determining each voter's intent. This, combined with manual tabulation, does result in errors. Since human errors, made in good faith, appear to be acceptable, it stands to reason that some level of error must also be acceptable in electronic voting. It is possible that humans charged with manu- ally tallying votes could attempt to influ- ence the results. Other poll workers and scrutineers serve as a control to limit the likelihood and magnitude of such manip- ulation. Electronic voting architectures should carefully consider this model. Any design should ensure it is technically feasible for two completely independent computer systems to operate in parallel and arrive at the same result, or at least within an acceptable margin of error. Canadians already rely on the Internet for a variety of personal, business, and government services. It only makes sense that, at some point in the future, Canadi- ans will have the option of casting their ballot online. Getting there will require innovation, including sophisticated con- trols against voter fraud and overcoming endpoint vulnerabilities. It will also re- quire political will and the confidence of citizens. Canadians already rely on the Internet for a variety of personal, business, and government services. It only makes sense that, at some point in the future, Canadians will have the option of casting their ballot online.

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