Vanguard Magazine

The lasT WorD 62 DECEMBER 2017/JANUARY 2018 www.vanguardcanada.com The increasingly-aggres- sive provocation by North Korea has result- ed in a renewal of the discussion regarding Ca- nadian participation in North American ballistic missile defence (BMD). This lightning-rod issue was essentially buried by the Martin Liberal gov- ernment in February 2005, when a decision was taken not to seek participation in this U.S. program. This choice was driven large- ly by political considerations of the time, which overrode any logical argument to incorporate this important capability into our North American Aerospace Defence, or NORAD, partnership. Now, twelve years later, the threat pre- sented by the capabilities of the so-called rogue nation of North Korea have evolved (along with their rhetoric) to the point where the fundamental rationale for the U.S.-developed missile defence system is more valid than ever. It is time to reconsid- er BMD cooperation with the Americans, if they'll have us. Naysayers will be quick to dredge up all the sensational and incomplete arguments that surfaced in 2004 and set so many Ca- nadians against BMD. Opponents main- tained that there was no threat, that BMD would precipitate nuclear proliferation, that a system would lead to the deployment of weapons in space, that it would be too ex- pensive, that it would destabilize the strate- gic power balance, and so on. The fact that these points prevailed was remarkable. In truth, the system being developed and tested did not involve nuclear weapons, and there is a strong argument that the de- ployment of a BMD system would actually contribute to stabil- ity, without any real perturbation of the nuclear strategic bal- ance. Whether Canada would be asked to make a contribution of some kind if we asked to join was never established, because we never managed to get past the negative perception of the sys- tem. Now, in 2017, a functioning capability exists after major investment in develop- ment, testing and implementation by the U.S. It is capable of providing a realistic defence against a limited attack, such as that capable by North Korea. Important- ly, it constitutes a significant deterrent and enables the feasibility of pursuing options less than outright retaliation if an attack occurred. Our lack of participation in BMD is an anomaly in our NORAD relationship. For 60 years, we have cooperated in the detection, warning and defence of the airborne threat from bombers and cruise missiles; we have participated together in the missile detection and warning mission to ensure that an effective deterrent is in place, backed up by the U.S. capability to respond, if ever needed. But when tech- nology evolved to the point where de- fence against ballistic missiles was reliable enough to be deployed, we declined to be involved in this most logical extension of the NORAD role. It is in our national security interest – indeed, a sovereign responsibility – to be involved in BMD. The outcome of an actual attack on U.S. territory should be of direct and dire concern to us all. The interconnectedness of our economies and infrastructures is such that we cannot dis- associate ourselves from the threat of a missile attack. The events of 9/11 provide an example of the consequences for us when the U.S. is attacked. It is interesting that Canada continues to support the project to develop and imple- ment a NATO ballistic missile defence sys- tem. When it comes to collective defence with our NATO partners, we have accepted the majority view that BMD is important to protect alliance territory. Why, then, would we not be in favour of providing similar protection for Canadian territory? The strident claims of North Korea, and the recent deployment of U.S. resources to take defensive action if a missile is launched, have once again reminded us of the poten- tial dangers from a "rogue" ballistic missile attack. It is time for Canadians to reassess, and get involved in North American de- fence – our participation in NORAD is the obvious vehicle to re-open discussion. Yes, there might be an "entry fee" to be paid in terms of personnel and financial expenditure, but this will be negotiable with our closest ally. We should be able to find an acceptable arrangement where we can participate and have some influ- ence on the employment of the capability, rather than sitting on the sidelines. Much has changed in the years since the negative BMD decision was taken. Let's take advantage of our close relationship with the U.S. to explore meaningful de- fence options to our mutual advantage. Lgen (Ret'd) george Macdonald is a former consultant in Ottawa. He was the Deputy Commander of NORAD from 1998 to 2001, during a time of intense BMD de- velopment in the U.S., which included the direct involvement of Canadian personnel assigned to the binational partnership. iT is in ouR naTional secuRiTy inTeResT – indeed, a soveReign ResponsibiliTy – To be involved in bmd. To Join or not to Join? BMd By lGen (ret'd) GeorGe Macdonald

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