Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2018 23 Sea (UNCLOS) to manage disagreements including the delimitation of its conti- nental shelves; 2) was instrumental in the creation of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015; 3) supports the Arctic Council's mandates enthusiastically and lobbied for the International Maritime Organiza- tion's now mandatory Polar Code; and 4) is still guided by two Arctic doctrines (albeit written pre 2014) 3 that enumer- ate Russia's national Arctic interest to be that of cooperation; the impetus being the importance of the development (read pre- dictably and sustainably) of Russia's Arc- tic Zone to Moscow's overall economic stability and success. NATO activity (be it its expanded membership or increased military activity by member states that are also Arctic littoral states) and the growing competition for resources provide justifica- tion for Russia (according to Moscow) to revise its military strategy in 2014, 4 assign- ing protection of Russian Arctic assets 5 to the Russian military and the need for more maritime capabilities in its 2015 revised maritime doctrine. 6 Akin to squeezing a balloon, increased pressure exerted or perceived in one area begets a reaction in another. Russia's ag- gression against Ukraine in the Donbas re- gion and illegal seizure of Crimea in 2014 prompted Western reactions. Predictably, NATO and NORAD re-evaluated their threat postures regarding Russia and policy language/positions changed. NORAD, for example, is increasingly concerned with the reach of Russia's cruise missiles. 7 Nor- way is hosting TRIDENT JUNCTURE in November 2018 which will have an Article 5 (collective defence) scenario and will in- clude the 29 members of NATO as well as Sweden and Finland, 8 and the U.S Navy re- vised its 2009 Arctic Road Map in 2014 to enhance the service's ability to operate in the Arctic, a continued U.S Coast Guard surface concern and responsibility. Mean- while, Russia was kicked out of the G8 (2014), Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff talks were suspended (2014), and NATO- Rus- sian Council activity all but ceased (2014). Of course a reminder of the egregious and numerous examples of Russian com- plicity and aid to a murderous Syrian gov- ernment are a reflexive, even required re- tort to what may be only discreet examples of better behaviour in the Arctic. And cer- tainly the annexation of territory from a sovereign state in modern times demands more than strongly worded letters of con- demnation. Only the naïve, logic suggests, would separate such behaviour from more cooperative behaviour seemingly con- tained to the Arctic. What remains then is an insuperable obstacle, constructed by both sides, to better relations. Neo-realists would counsel NATO and NORAD to spend more and increase military presence in the Arctic, even at the risk of creating a security dilemma for Russia requiring it to continue to do the same. If, however, the West can continue to encourage positive Russian actions in the Arctic while defending against its behav- iour elsewhere, Arctic issues may represent a conduit to improved relations. The Arctic Council, the premier Arctic intergovern- mental forum, has fostered cooperation in the Arctic and created avenues for dialogue to address other Russian policies/actions of concern. This does not mean that the West excuses, ignores, accepts or capitulates to Russian behaviour elsewhere. On the con- trary. NATO is more important than ever [especially strategically critical zones like the UK-Greenland-Iceland (maritime) gap which Russia exploits]. NORAD's Norway is hosting TRIDENT JUNCTURE in November 2018 which will have an Article 5 (collective defence) scenario and will include the 29 members of NATO as well as Sweden and Finland , and the U.S Navy revised its 2009 Arctic Road Map in 2014 to enhance the service's ability to operate in the Arctic, a continued U.S Coast Guard surface concern and responsibility. Evolution of North American defence (EvoNAD) study is vital to consider all of the future threats facing North America, in- cluding those posed by Russia. Rather, it is time to appreciate the mandate and scope of the Arctic Council, draw important les- sons from its successes and actively celebrate when international norms and a rules-based order are supported. Dealing with the Arctic Russia Currently, the majority of global experts, officials and stakeholders alike agree that no foreseeable conflict exists in the Arc- tic over Arctic issues. Observers expect/ consider that any potential conflict involv- ing the Arctic would originate externally and "spill over" into and/or through the North. What remains with regard to the most prevalent, other-than- defence-re- lated, Arctic issues largely rests within the scope of the Arctic Council. As a result, Russia's participation in the Arctic Coun- cil is not only vital, but the best avenue of engagement. Understanding the role of the Arctic Council and Russia as one of the most important member states, therefore, is vital to global defence and diplomatic expectations. The Arctic Council represents the top international organization for non-military issues (as outlined in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration), 9 led by the eight member states with input from the indigenous Per- manent Participants. As such, the ministe- rial- and ambassador-level body offers a consensus-based, highly inclusive forum from which to identify and address various issues before they rise to intensified levels. From a military perspective, the ability of a regional forum to manage a full spectrum of conventional issues helps to reduce the number of disputes that require moni- ArCtiC

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