Vanguard Magazine

The second SAO Plenary meeting of the Finnish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council held March 2018 in Levi, Finland. Photo credit: Arctic Council Secretariat / Linnea Nordström 24 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2018 www.vanguardcanada.com toring. Defence agencies tend to sustain awareness and analysis of prioritized is- sues normally managed within the politi- cal sphere – issues which involve tensions assigned to elevated or escalated levels before circumstances reach a precarious zone of miscalculation. Throughout each level, defence organizations may have an increasingly critical support function and responsibility to help de-conflict tensions during heightened diplomatic struggles. (Consider, for example, the military op- tions for any and all scenarios that were re- quired while recent negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea took place). Given that the Arctic Council avoids dis- cussions associated with military security issues – a condition originally required by the United States – discussions tend to fo- cus on mutual areas of concern for which all parties seek assistance. This leads to greater clarity and opportunity for issue identification and definition, not to men- tion buy-in by all states. Cooperative efforts should neither be dismissed nor treated as trivial. Take for example, the very contentious issue of un- regulated fishing in the Arctic resulting in the five Arctic littoral states signing on to a moratorium in 2015 10 – thanks, in part, to the good offices of the Artic Council. More often than not, states establish mu- tually-beneficial opportunities based on a single point from which to cooperate. In a highly globalized, economically inter- dependent world, soft power continues to provide the more flexible and nuanced multinational negotiating options. As ex- pected, formal agreements, once estab- lished normally through treaties and con- ventions (hard law – the most common form of recognized international law), require maintenance and oversight. When aspects of agreements come under con- flict, deliberate or otherwise, hard power options involving political coercion, po- tentially backed by military intervention or economic sanctions, may become nec- essary to resolve tensions. So far, such circumstances do not exist for the Arctic, nor seem probable given that all decisions reached under the Arctic Council frame- work are by consensus and were decided on by all members. The Arctic Council remains the lead in- stitution working to identify and define issues through advocacy as well as spon- sored projects. Its outputs include delivery of rigourous and authoritative information to policy/decision makers as well as to the public before an avoidable disaster strikes and forces policy reform into a typical hind- sight cycle. Russia continues to be a com- mitted and active member in this regard, signaling the importance of acting rather than reacting. As an additional benefit, all other non-Arctic Council-related issues thus become clearer and more manage- able. The Arctic Council's contribution to regional stability helps provide confidence in the international community, and should be used as a metric by defence organiza- tions for analysis and planning efforts. Dealing with the "other" Russia The overwhelming similarity in advice given to various parliamentary and government committees in the West to deal with Russia tend to have the Eastern Europe/Syria Rus- sia in mind. Recommendations tend to fol- low along similar lines of rediscovering past activities and capabilities that were common during the Cold War but have since atro- phied/ended. Such things as: • Achieve all domain awareness and im- prove intelligence surveillance and recon- naissance capabilities; • Anticipate new threats in new domains including in space and via yet undiscov- ered technologies; • Commit more attention to cyber vulner- abilities/cyber offensive capabilities; • Increase the number and scope of special forces; • Acquire/improve anti-submarine warfare skills; • Revive NATO's Supreme Allied Com- mand Atlantic (SACLANT) position (which will again be based in Norfolk but called Atlantic Command) to better co- ordinate seams and gaps in the GIUK gap (for example); • Acquire cruise missile defence capabilities; • Re-evaluate command and control struc- tures with a penchant for battle manage- ment configurations; • Study seams and gaps. And all while continuing to recruit, retain and train combat capable militaries despite changing demographics, restricted budgets and ongoing operations. Indeed, the list is long, and very costly. The costs are untenable when one consid- ers militaries are also called upon to deal with natural disasters and conduct (aerial in the case of Canada) search and rescue op- erations. Defence of the nation from mili- tary threats remains the principal purpose ArCtiC The Arctic Council remains the lead institution working to identify and define issues through advo- cacy as well as sponsored projects. Its outputs include delivery of rigourous and authoritative information to policy/decision makers as well as to the public before an avoidable disaster strikes and forces policy reform into a typical hindsight cycle.

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