Vanguard Magazine

22 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2019 www.vanguardcanada.com arCtiC Clearly, a balance was made in the above statement. Political priorities must be re- spected, but so must the realities of the op- erational world. While the term "climate change" cannot be used for political rea- sons in American documents, the USCG is right to note the operational reality that is an Arctic with thinner and reduced ice conditions, especially near the coasts. What is more, both Canada and the USCG recognize it is indigenous popula- tions who are likely to bear the brunt of the changes. The USCG notes: "Arctic communities, including the Alaska Na- tive and indigenous populations, will be on the front lines of adapting to changes in the Arctic." 7 There is hope that per- haps the United States, which has a very strained relationship with its indigenous peoples (as does Canada), may start to see the wisdom of consulting community groups and working with them as it seeks to expand activity in the Arctic. While the United States federal government may not be consistently popular in Alaska, the U.S. military is looked upon very favor- ably throughout the state, especially in indigenous areas. Alaska has the highest national proportion of military service members and veterans, many of whom are indigenous, resulting in the military hav- ing a strong relationship throughout the state as a result. The United States, how- ever, lacks a formal indigenous northern program that ensures local knowledge is part of any incident response and support by the military in Alaska. DND's Canadian Ranger and Junior Ranger programs may be something for the U.S. military and Coast Guard to consider. Second, there are references to the changing world order and the potential for competition with revisionist pow- ers. Deterrence and great power politics, therefore, are returning to the lexicon of both militaries. While Canada mentions Russia's "proven willingness to test the in- ternational security environment," 8 China is referenced as "a rising economic power with an increasing ability to project influ- ence globally." 9 The United States refer- ences both but with many more Russian mentions than China (26 instances versus 18 in the DoD Arctic strategy, for exam- ple) principally because China does not yet have permanent Arctic military presence and is more limited than Russia operation- ally. Interestingly, the United States made clear that it "does not recognize any other claims to Arctic status by any other State than [the] eight [Arctic] nations," indi- cating that the Chinese term "near-Arctic nation" lacks any official legitimacy. 10 In all three documents there is a sense that, while the capabilities of these near-peer competitors are most certainly on the rise, neither Canada nor the United States are fully agreed on the intentions of these powers vis-à-vis the Arctic. Strategically, the military legacy of the Arctic was driven by the shortest missile route between the primary Cold War belligerents. Now the likely scenario is that an incident in an- other part of the world could provoke a response in North America. Therefore, the Arctic is referenced as a "throughway" or potential "avenue of attack," rather than a theatre of conflict. A threat, to be credible (i.e. elevated from an informational status to credible-threat status based on action- able intelligence), must have demonstrat- ed capabilities as well as intent, and given the cooperation and contributions of both Russia and China to the Arctic Council, the mandatory Polar Code, not to men- tion the creation of a sixteen-year morato- rium on commercial fishing in the Arctic, other-than-cooperative intentions for the North remain, to date, opaque at best. Even established unilateral, binational, and multilateral defence-related interests/ relationships can get "lost in translation" when publishing national strategies. While Canada is quick to reference the impor- tance of especially NORAD and NATO to deter these potential adversaries, there is only one mention of NORAD in the DoD Arctic Strategy (as key to the defense of the northern approaches) versus 10 references to NATO. This also includes concerns about the reactivated Greenland-Iceland- UK (GIUK) gap located in the North Atlantic. The USCG mentions NATO twice but does not mention NORAD even though the USCG is a vital contributor to NORAD's Common Maritime Operating picture. Third, acquiring and maintaining capa- bilities to be able to operate in the Arctic, both for deterrence and aid to the civil powers, is a preoccupation of all three policies. In simple terms, a capability equals the resources plus skills to fulfill a mission requirement which is guided by risk analysis (the likeliness of a hazard to occur, multiplied by the potential for negative impacts). Increasingly, capabili- ties must address all domains: land, mari- time, air, space, and cyber. With a rise in the amount of activity in the Arctic comes the need for increased safety and security requirements related to search and rescue as well as capabilities to detect, deter and defeat potential adversaries. For all three strategies, one notes that none of the fleets (USN, RCN or USCG) have the capability or capacity to assure sustained maritime surface presence in the high lati- tudes. 11 The CCG comes closest to hav- ing this capacity, but it is a civilian safety organization only. Fourth and finally, the other common- ality is that none of the strategies have adequate funds earmarked to achieve the goals found in the policies. DoD's Arctic strategy has the most elegant way of sug- gesting cost will be an issue when it states that it will consider its capabilities, pos- ture, operations, and activities necessary for deterrence in the Arctic "in a strategy- driven and resource-informed way." 12 In A member of the Arctic Response Company Group stands guard near Crystal City during Exercise GUERRIER NORDIQUE in Resolute Bay, Nunavut on March 4, 2019. Photo: Cavalier Marc-André Leclerc, 5 CMBG, DND

• Cover