Vanguard Magazine

36 APRIL/MAY 2020 www.vanguardcanada.com CoViD-19 Tantamount to 'kicking them while they are down', a devastating incident that con- sumes and exhausts economic, military, healthcare and social support resources, leaves a serious dent – unprecedented un- employment, lowered GDP and increased debt, bankruptcies and social assistance claims, to name a few, drain coffers. Is COVID-19 a threat to national secu- rity or a nation's stability? Could it expose opportunities for non-military, coercive tactics in the wake of its devastation? Not really. That could only happen if a nation was unprepared. The January Crisis: The Security of National Security The COVID-19 pandemic and the con- stantly evolving script has morphed the lives of several millions into one that is unrecognizable. Had nations diligently forecasted on a broad schema of possible events and their impacts to public health, safety and services, infrastructures and in- terconnected systems (all of which con- tribute to national security), it would have made for a boring movie. However, it is becoming an excellent crisis management case study. Was Canada and the US adequately prepared? Was the damage effectively mitigated? Were correct measures implemented and at the right time? Is an "unprecedented crisis" a rea- sonable excuse for shortcomings in the re- sponse phase? Spoiler Alert: No, not at all. National security, not as a function, but a calculated posture that a nation strives to maintain at all times and at any cost, offsets anticipated damages. Only decades ago, national security was defined as the pro- tection of a nation against military attack. In present day, technologies, globalization and the commoditization of free markets have changed that. Former US Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, who served under President Carter from 1977-1981, was key in developing the US' post-Cold War national security policy. At that time, the US was becom- ing a formidable, well-armed super-power in an era imperiled by nuclear war, calmed only by the arms race, strategic planning and the US' national defense policy. Brown recognized a nation's prosperity and national security were intrinsically tied to regional, federal and transnational levels, that he defined as, "the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to pre- serve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders". While decades-old, these policy elements were general but all-encompassing enough to still be relevant, despite changes in in- dustries, technology and geo-political shifts. Now, we view modern day national security as a duty of government to ensure prosperity, spanning critical non-military domains tied to democracy, fundamental rights, public safety and the overall well- being of a nation. The stability of a nation and its prosper- ity, as set by its constitutional values, are attained by providing protection from terrorism, crime and violence, access and availability of basic and essential infrastruc- tures and services, safe and healthy food, water and environment, a resilient work- force and a stable economy. Often over- looked, another contributor to a nation's stability, especially in times of crisis, are the psychosocial needs of its people; lofty and academic, if you think about it, it makes sense. Whether a terrorist attack, pandemic, tornado or any other disaster, the com- munications, response and assurance are crucial to meeting and managing psy- chological needs and preserving human behaviours. How, and if, these are met will dictate whether societal responses are negative (hoarding, civil disorder, rioting, looting) or positive (communal, coopera- tive, volunteerism). Contributing needs include basic needs (access to safe food, water, shelter), secu- rity (individual safety, order and predict- ability), civil rights (equality, democracy and justice), social needs, the ability to as- semble, connect and enjoy freedom and autonomy. The destabilization of any of these has a profound and qualitative effect on a nation, its people and collective pro- ductivity. Whether it's an attack by a nation state or violent non-state actors, sector mo- nopolization by a multinational, a natural disaster, such as floods, droughts and, yes, epidemics and pandemics, all should be responded to by an effective policy. Eas- ier said than done, implementing policy down procedures at the operational level is something else altogether. Retired US Marine General James Mat- tis once said, "PowerPoint makes us stu- pid". Mattis had a point. White papers and PowerPoint decks don't win wars or pro- tect nations. Best practices are only use- ful for comparative purposes, all-hazards planning is too general and emergency preparedness only addresses a fraction of the problem at hand. What it all comes down to is comprehen- sive analysis, intelligence, continued envi- ronmental scanning and re-assessment. Methods Amidst the Madness In a time of crisis, particular systems and services are necessary, some critical, to meet the essential needs of a nation. However, identifying those systems and services, what sector and who (private or public) has purview over them, analysing the operational requirements and impacts of reduced operations for all stakeholders (other systems, organizations, partners, etc.) is a complex and arduous but enor- mously important, exercise. The goals are to establish and maintain an acceptable security posture, operations and level of risk, while isolating assets to reduce impact and losses throughout the lifecycle of a specific crisis. With some losses difficult to quantify, like democracy and reputation, the contingency and con- tinuity exercise must include threat-risk assessment and asset valuation (products, services, suppliers, people, equipment and infrastructure), stakeholder and crisis sce- nario modelling paired with continuous monitoring, vulnerability, response and recovery analysis. The threat itself must be characterized with as much relevant data and attribution as possible, well before analysis. Using CO- VID-19, a new virus, as an example, there are two sides to consider: the known epi- demiological factors of coronaviruses and viruses in general (how they behave in the environment) and their pathogenesis (how they behave with and in the target host). Important as input data to baselines and models, a number of other factors lay the foundation for the mixed-methods meth-

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