Vanguard Magazine

32 JUNE/JULY 2020 www.vanguardcanada.com AIR For NORAD, the re-emergence of a potentially effective Russian threat has brought the Command full circle. The LRA's operations in the Arctic, approach- ing U.S. and Canadian airspace (but not violating internationally agreed borders) appear to be realistic and systematic ex- ercises of the LRA/AS-23 capacity to launch limited strikes against North America as foreseen in the escalation doc- trine. NORAD's capacity to warn of, and blunt limited strikes is deemed essential to provide the U.S. leadership with the op- portunity to tailor a diplomatic response combined with minimal conventional re- taliation rather than an immediate nuclear strike, which, however small, could accel- erate the dynamics of escalation. The new concepts of escalation and deterrence, combined with technological advances, place a renewed emphasis on early warn- ing and attack assessment, missions at the heart of modern-day NORAD that now require new approaches. China China has been pursuing a massive trans- formation of its large but old-fashioned military to produce a technologically ad- vanced, agile and professional force ca- pable of projecting power beyond China's traditional sphere of influence. Part of this effort is the expansion and modern- ization of its strategic nuclear forces with a new generation of land-based ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines. Follow- ing the example of the U.S. and Russia, China has begun a program for a long- range strategic bomber with conventional and nuclear precision strike capabilities possibly embodied in a new generation of ALCMs. This capability could allow China to conduct both conventional and limited nuclear operations with a high degree of precision as a tool in crisis management and intimidation. The "Rogue Nation" Threats North Korea and Iran pose lesser threats, but the former has attained nuclear weap- ons status and a basic (and as yet not fully developed) ICBM capability in unknown but small numbers. Iran continues to progress in its regional ballistic missile programs but has not yet perfected an ICBM. Perhaps of more concern is the proliferation of dual capable cruise mis- siles to countries of concern or non-state actors. Russia has offered for sale a cruise missile - the SS-N-30, in a shipping con- tainer. This concept could appeal to non- state actors such as Hizbollah or countries seeking an asymmetrical counter to U.S. superiority. Other arms suppliers have of- fered similar systems. Finally, the terrorist threat persists. Al- though recent attacks in various countries have been carried out by small numbers of attackers or individuals, the 9/11 model is still a concern because of the shock effect of a mass casualty attack and the inevitable economic losses which would follow. Potential Policy Challenges Facing NORAD Going Forward The Canadian Government's intentions regarding the defence of North America, our defence relationship with the U.S. and NORAD in particular are stated in its 2017 defence policy statement, Strong, Secure, Engaged. There is no change in the priority assigned to the defence of North America and NORAD from pre- vious defence policy documents, which is ranked second only to the defence of Canada itself. SSE states that Canada will ensure it has the military capabilities required to meet its NORAD obligations, including sufficient mission-ready fighter aircraft, U.S. commanders have managed to make the bifurcated NORAD/NorthCom missile warning and defence mission work, but this could become a serious policy issue in the event a future commander (or Commander in Chief) considers the arrangement undesirable or unworkable. Marines with 5th Battalion launch reduced-range practice rockets from a M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System during a joint combined arms live-fire exercise at Fort Greely, Alaska, March 2, 2020 during U.S. Northern Command exercise Arctic Edge 2020. Photo: NORAD.

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