Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com JUNE/JULY 2020 33 AIR and modernised aerospace and maritime domain awareness and aerospace control. SSE elaborates: Canada and the United States are seeking an innovative techno- logical solution to continental defence challenges including early warning. Stud- ies are ongoing to determine how best to replace this important capability as part of the overall NORAD modernization. New fighter aircraft for the NORAD mission and NWS modernization are included in the "new initiatives" listed in SSE, imply- ing that funding will be available when appropriate. A decision on fighter pro- curement is unavoidable and it should be noted that no decision is in a very real sense, a policy decision. If the policy context for NORAD is am- ply stated in SSE, a number of subsidiary policies must be established to operation- alise SSE's intent. In particular, replace- ment of the surveillance capability will require decisions on bi-national cost shar- ing, the technological choice and location of new sensors. Although specifics are clas- sified, references in documents such as the U.S. 2019 Missile Defense Review suggest that systems which could detect and track both air-breathing and non-air breathing threats (i.e., ballistic missiles and hyper- sonic glide vehicles) are receiving consid- eration. U.S. planners might see adoption of such dual-capable systems as essential to continuation of the missile warning func- tion under NORAD. Moving the NWS north will probably require the construc- tion of at least one fighter Forward Oper- ating Location. Experience shows that Canadian de- fence policy statements should be read as aspirational, subject to Government's fiscal contingencies and electoral politics. Differing policy outcomes from those implied in Strong, Secure, Engaged are not inconceivable. However, it must be noted that policy regarding NORAD is bi-national in nature and as such, closely watched by those elements of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Congress most concerned with homeland defence. A new era of state-to-state strategic competition, especially in regard to Rus- sia, could be emerging. Should the U.S.- Russia New START arms control agree- ment not be extended in the aftermath of the abandonment of the INF and Open Skies Treaties, it is possible that a build- up of nuclear weapons on both sides could occur. Canada will be expected to do its part or the U.S. (following on Roosevelt's formulation in 1938) will do whatever it takes to assure its own defence, regardless of Canadian sovereignty. President Trump continues to criti- cize NATO allies' defence spending and it is possible that he might question the adequacy of Canada's contribution to NORAD's cost structure and deployed capabilities. Should Canada prove unable to decide on a fighter procurement, the U.S. could propose basing its own aircraft in Canada (as was the case in the 1950's and 60's in Newfoundland), with operational control vested exclusively in American officers. Similarly, hesitation over NWS replace- ment would lead the U.S. to seek a na- tional solution, even if inferior to one us- ing Canadian geography. In either of these cases, NORAD's survival could be prob- lematic. A NORAD reduced to symbolism as a subordinate command would no lon- ger place Canadians in a bi-national chain of command reaching to the highest levels and a unique entry into U.S. decision- making would be lost. Conclusions NORAD has now been in existence for over 60 years. Its longevity reflects its adaptability as missions have evolved from a more or less "conventional" defence against attacking bombers which any World War II commander of an air defence campaign would recognise. In the ther- monuclear or ICBM era, NORAD pro- vided early warning and a hedge against a sudden, decapitation strike, functions vital to strategic stability at the height of the Cold War. In the years after the Cold War, NORAD took on what appeared to be "make work" missions such as track- ing drug runners while failing to think as creatively as popular author Tom Clancy, who predicted in fiction (Debt of Honor, 1994) the use of a civilian airliner to attack the Capitol Building in Washington. Stung by the defeat suffered on 9/11, NORAD recovered quickly to deploy a new basing scheme as well as a detailed protocol for countering any further terrorist attacks us- ing civilian aircraft. Today, with a renewed air threat and de- stabilising doctrine including nuclear use from Russia, NORAD has circled back to its original mission, the air defence of North America. But there is more to NORAD's longevity than its capacity for adaptation. NORAD also operationalises three important prin- ciples of Canadian strategy for managing its defence relations with the U.S. By ac- cepting responsibility for the joint defence of the continent, Canada's fundamental requirement of "defence against help" is secured. By participating in a bi-national military command serving both govern- ments, Canada achieves a voice in its own defence. By establishing a treaty-based in- stitution, with predictable understandings and a structure for addressing changed cir- cumstances, Canada's proven method of dealing with the larger neighbour to the south is extended to a key element of the defence relationship. For these reasons, NORAD continues to serve the national interest. This is an abridged version of a joint Pol- icy Paper from The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute that was originally published on cgai.ca. It is reprinted here by permission. Dr. Michael Dawson received his doctorate in European History from the University of Toronto. Aer joining the Canadian Foreign Service, he served abroad in New Delhi, Moscow, Washington DC and Colorado Springs, where he was Canadian Political Advisor to the US Commander of NORAD and US Northern Command. Canadian Forces Station Alert. Photo: NORAD.

• Cover