Vanguard Magazine

cycle of Federal fleet construction which had by 2008 led to considerable atrophy of Canada's large ship construction capa- bilities. The adopted methodology was similar to that used by many allies in terms of establishing strategic relationships with selected Canadian shipyards (initially two and recently modified to three). The initial shipyard competitive sourc- ing of two shipyards occurred in 2011 to create sustained shipbuilding activity for 25 years or more in each. NSPS affected the CSC project by including it in what was named as the Combat package of na- val shipbuilding work that was competed and won by Irving Shipbuilding Incor- porated (ISI). For those interested in the details of NSPS (the good and the not so good), I refer you to a number of CGAI papers that I have written in the past. NSPS set out to reap the benefits of a collaborative relationship with the ship- yards which since 2012 has played out in many positive ways with ISI for the CSC project. From the outset, it was understood that CSC was unique in two ways. The first was its high degree of complexity that de- manded a different set of expectations and execution approaches. Secondly, it was the sole surface combatant under NSPS, with weapons and sensor systems requiring a high degree of integration that rendered the project developmental in nature. Giv- en these peculiarities, Canada could have pursued CSC entirely outside of NSPS by running a separate competitive process in all aspects. In such a case, teams would have been unrestricted in their teaming ar- rangements with respect to the prime con- tractor, designers, and shipyards. Howev- er, such an approach could have rendered NSPS non-viable having so reduced the work for ISI in the Combat package. Canada conducted research and analy- sis regarding prime contractor options for nAVAL The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS, now known as the National Shipbuilding Strategy - NSS) was initiated in 2008, announced in 2010, and entered implementation in early 2012. The intent was to address the boom-and-bust cycle of Federal fleet construction which had by 2008 led to considerable atrophy of Canada's large ship construction capabilities. www.vanguardcanada.com FEBRUARY/MARCH 2021 13 CSC design and construction. It is com- mon for shipyards to be assigned prime contractor responsibility for long produc- tion runs of ships. This is less costly than paying a separate prime contractor for many years after the first ships had been delivered and also avoids the 'thin prime' model which is often problematic. Cana- da selected the shipyard prime contractor model and negotiated a related agreement with ISI – such agreement contingent on contracts being awarded and the shipyard meeting a defined target state in terms of prescribed practices to yield the desired level of productivity. Requirements The Statement of Requirements (SoR) for a warship that will be in service for at least 30 years is always a daunting task. The continuous evolution of new technologies and threats leads to a new weapon and sen- sor systems which the SoR must try to take An artist's rendering of the new Canadian Surface Combatant. Photo: BAE Systems

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