Vanguard Magazine

14 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2021 www.vanguardcanada.com nAVAL quired to meet RFP priority requirements in a compressed timeframe between RFP release and bid submission. Hence the nu- ances in terms of the broader impacts to existing systems and cost/schedule risks would only be apparent during a more detailed design process after selection and contract award. For example, in the case of the selected Type 26 parent design, options available from Australia's Hunter Class modified Type 26 design could ad- equately meet Canadian requirements and at reduced risks. Such considerations argued during RFP development for the need for a requirements reconciliation ac- tivity once a preferred bidder's proposal had been selected. In terms of the CSC's post-contract award requirements reconciliation, any proposal to replace as-bid equipment must respect the integrity of the competitive procurement process such that subsequent equipment system replacements would not materially change (or be seen to change) the results of the Bid Evaluation process. One should note that such decisions do not change the SoR which was the Royal Canadian Navy's stated requirement set that shaped the RFP, against which re- quirements reconciliation options would be measured and by which the modified frigates would be assessed for performance during the trials program. However, the SOR is likely to change over time to ad- dress emergent technologies and threats by the time the 15th CSC plan is in play around the mid-2030s, some 20 years since the SOR was set for the 2016 RFP. Procurement Process Attributes Once industry has been engaged, every procurement process obtains approval for a procurement strategy and plan. The ini- tially approved CSC procurement approach was a best-of-breed approach entitled the 'most competitive procurement' strategy. It consisted of running two competitive processes, one to pick a warship designer and one to pick a combat systems integra- tor. Once selected these two entities would be responsible for completing each of the equipment and systems. In essence, this was a 'clean sheet of paper' design that maxi- mized competition, but which might have been ten years in the design phase with the attendant significant risk. After the initial requirements reconcilia- tion, it was obvious that a number of exist- ing warship designs exhibited the refined HLMRs in the SoR, this being a change of consequence. It enabled the selection of a modified military off-the-shelf meth- odology entitled the 'most qualified team' procurement strategy and employed com- monly with our allies. It would preserve the advantages of competition while en- abling schedule and cost-saving opportu- nities at reduced risk. With ISI pre-selected as the prime con- tractor and in keeping with the intended strategic and collaborative relationship, the RFP was jointly developed by Canada and the shipyard. The effort required to reach an agreed RFP for issue by ISI was onerous but offered benefits as well. As an example, this was very evident in address- ing a perennially challenging contractual term – intellectual property (IP). CSC was no different than other platform acquisi- tions in that Canada wished to maximize IP rights for itself while industry wishes to restrict the offer of the broad use of their IP. Furthermore, for existing ship designs IP rights were already negotiated for many equipment systems creating a reluctance to reopen expensive negotiations during competition. Here, as in many other ar- eas, ISI's input was important in bringing a commercial perspective to what could realistically be expected. The resulting solicitation process was required to respect all contracting prin- ciples of Canada and netted three compre- hensive bids. The bid evaluation was then conducted by Canada with ISI providing input for consideration. The final selection of the preferred bidder employed Can- ada's standard review and approval pro- cesses. As is the norm the equipment sys- tems (and their suppliers) as identified in the winning bid complied collectively with the prescribed Industrial and Technical Benefits (ITB) requirements of the RFP. In CSC, the ITB value proposition carried significant weight in the evaluation. As often happens, some capable Canadi- an companies appear to have not been part of the selected bidder's proposal, causing them to make representation to Canada af- into account. The SoR also identifies a na- tion's unique requirements which include such things as the roles to be performed and more tactical matters such as regula- tory and operating protocols. From these, the 'high-level mandatory requirements' (HLMRs) are established. I can attest to the years of work that was invested in the CSC SoR. Because of the nation's unique require- ments, any off-the-shelf design will have to be modified and integrated into the se- lected platform. And because of the evolv- ing threats weapon and sensor performance requirements must be defined with 'legs'. If such requirements can be met by equip- ment already in service, one might procure a system likely to be obsolete long before the last ship is built 20 years after contract award and well after the first of the class was delivered. Alternatively, when the SoR sets performance standards requiring further de- velopment, care must be taken in the degree of equipment system development costs and risks that accrue. RFPs routinely quote a Technical Readiness Level (TRL) protocol with mature systems being '9' on a scale of 1 to 9. As a data point in the CPF proj- ect, many Canadian systems were selected that were rated at low TRL levels yet most delivered successfully. However, it is more common for systems to be required with TRL6/7 from manufacturers with a record of delivering effective systems on time. Given the extensive work done on CSC requirements, the SoR remained designat- ed as 'preliminary' for an extended period of time. An initial requirement reconcilia- tion activity occurred based on assistance from ISI in identifying companies to con- duct a comprehensive review and in con- tracting two reputable companies to ex- ecute an independent analysis. That work led to refinements of the HLMRs in the SoR which enabled consideration of an im- proved procurement plan. The amended SOR was then integrated into the State- ment of Work for the RFP with detailed technical performance and evidentiary de- liverables defined for all requirements as captured in a prioritization scheme. For the CSC project, which selected the proposed design based on the Type 26, one would expect that the bidder did their design assessments of modifications re- Aer the initial requirements reconciliation, it was obvious that a number of existing warship designs exhibited the refined HLMRs in the SoR, this being a change of consequence.

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