Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com APRIL/MAY 2021 25 NORAD to de-escalate." While some academic ob- servers and journalists have discounted the meaning of the expressed doctrine, most analysts - especially those linked to NATO states - do not (Zysk 2018, 4). Implementation of the Russian doctrine would begin with warnings expressed through diplomatic channels followed by public statements to the effect that Russia will react unless the status quo ante is re- stored. Movements of assets and exercises, visible to adversarial monitoring, would strengthen the warning. Intimidation tac- tics, such as close approaches to national borders or even overflights might follow. At a certain point, a limited conventional strike might be employed, followed by a low-yield nuclear strike, probably on a tar- get where few individuals would be killed. Should the desired effect not be achieved, at that point, Russia might choose to ex- ecute a limited nuclear strike with low yield weapons against military targets, escalating to carefully selected key civilian economic and infrastructure targets. The latter is sometimes described as "strategic opera- tions to destroy critically important tar- gets," intended to arouse public opinion favouring a stand-down in the face of Rus- sian determination. At every stage, intense public messaging plus cyber harassment would be employed (Zysk 2018, 7). Whatever the finer points of deterrence/ escalation theory may be, Russian military modernisation has placed high priority on the necessary precision long-range conven- tional and nuclear weapons. In particular, the Long Range Aviation (LRA), far from being a moribund Cold War relic, has re- ceived extensive modernisations of its two strategic bombers, the Tu-95MS (NATO reporting name Bear-H) and the Tu-160 (Blackjack); the Tu-160 has been placed back into production to replace the Bears. An entirely new strategic bomber is un- der development. (SIPRI Yearbook 2018. 244) A major part of the modernisation has been the deployment of a new ALCM (air launched cruise missile), with two vari- ants, the Kh-101 (conventional) and Kh- 102 (nuclear). They have been allocated the NATO Reporting Name AS-23 Ko- diak. The AS-23 is estimated to have 2,500 to 2,800 km range, capable of extremely precise targeting and very difficult to detect and intercept. (Zysk 2018, 8) The Russian Navy's most modern nuclear attack subma- rines as well as its modern diesel-electric submarines are being equipped with the SS-N-30 Kalibr Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), with a range of 2,500 km. (CSIS Missile Defense Project, 2018. "Missiles of Russia;" SIPRI, 249-250) Russia has an- nounced development of several hyperson- ic missiles; as their capabilities are not yet known, their strategic significance remains to be assessed. The conflict in Syria has provided an occa- sion for the practical implementation of the doctrine. Syria, with its Russian naval base, has long been seen in Moscow as a strategi- cally important ally, providing Russia with the ability to deploy a naval presence on the Mediterranean, among other strategic ben- efits, as noted by Andrew Parasiliti, director of the Center for Global Risk and Security at the RAND Corporation, cited by Ann Simmons in the Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2017. At various times, LRA Bears and Blackjacks, along with the LRA's medium bomber, Backfire-C, have launched vol- leys of the new ALCMs against ISIS and rebel targets. Russian submarines have also launched Kalibr LACMs. A reasonable conclusion in Moscow would be that the escalation doctrine has now been success- fully implemented: President Trump first took great care to avoid inadvertent U.S.- Russia clashes and reduced the U.S. pres- ence in that theatre. For NORAD, the re-emergence of a po- tentially effective Russian threat has brought the Command full circle. The LRA's opera- tions in the Arctic, approaching U.S. and Canadian airspace (but not violating inter- nationally agreed borders) appear to be re- alistic and systematic exercises of the LRA / AS-23 capacity to launch limited strikes against North America as foreseen in the escalation doctrine. NORAD's capacity to warn of, and blunt limited strikes is deemed essential to provide the U.S. leadership with the opportunity to tailor, for example, a diplomatic response combined with mini- mal conventional retaliation rather than an immediate nuclear strike, which, however SSE does state that Canada will fulfill its NORAD obligations "with new capacity in some areas" and "modernize NORAD to meet existing challenges and evolving threats to North America, taking into account the full range of threats." (nuclear) escalation paths," which present new challenges to the warning systems and defences (Krepinevich 2009, 78-80). Russia Beginning in the late 1960's, successful U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control negotiations clarified the mutual understanding of de- terrence while placing limits and then re- ductions, on the two superpowers' massive arsenals. However, under President Putin, Russia has articulated a revisionist foreign policy heavily influenced by NATO's expan- sion, its suppression of Serbia in the 1999 Balkan war and its support for an anti-Rus- sian Colour Revolution regime change in Ukraine. Russian doctrine thus draws upon its historical memories of invasion as well as its fear of American and Allied capability to destabilise Russia through precision con- ventional strikes on its strategic weapons, command and control nodes and leader- ship and thus gain a decisive advantage in any regional conflict in its neighbourhood (Steil, 2018). In response, for the better part of a decade, Russian defence ministers and senior military officers have articulated a doctrine commonly described as "escalate

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