Vanguard Magazine

26 APRIL/MAY 2021 www.vanguardcanada.com NORAD small, could accelerate the dynamics of es- calation. The new concepts of escalation and deterrence, combined with technologi- cal advances, such as hypersonic missiles, place a renewed emphasis on early warning and attack assessment, missions at the heart of modern-day NORAD that now require new approaches. China China has, for over a decade, been pursu- ing a massive transformation of its large but old-fashioned military to produce a technologically advanced, agile and pro- fessional force capable of projecting power beyond China's traditional sphere of influ- ence. Part of this effort is the expansion and modernization of its strategic nuclear forces with a new generation of land-based ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines. Following the example of the U.S. and Russia, China has begun a program for a long-range strategic bomber with conven- tional and nuclear precision strike capabili- ties possibly embodied in a new generation of ALCMs. (SIPRI Yearbook 2018. 266) This capability could allow China to con- duct both conventional and limited nucle- ar operations with a high degree of pre- cision as a tool in crisis management and intimidation. (SIPRI Yearbook 2018. 261) The "Rogue Nation" Threats North Korea and Iran pose lesser threats, but the former has attained nuclear weap- ons status and a basic (and as yet not fully developed) ICBM capability in unknown but small numbers. Iran continues to progress in its regional ballistic missile pro- grams but has not yet perfected an ICBM. These two states amply demonstrate the kind of risks posed by proliferation. Per- haps of more concern is the proliferation of cruise missiles to countries of concern and / or non-state actors. Many of these are dual capable and can be targeted with a high degree of accuracy; Michael Stott reported for Reuters in 2010 that Russia has offered for sale a "cruise missile - the SS-N-30, in a shipping container." This concept could appeal to non-state actors such as Hizbollah or countries seeking an asymmetrical counter to U.S. superiority. Other arms suppliers have offered similar systems. Finally, the terrorist threat persists. Al- though recent attacks in various countries have been carried out by small numbers of attackers or individuals, the 9 / 11 model is still a concern if for no other reasons than the shock effect of a mass casualty attack and the inevitable economic losses which would follow. Conclusion Russia's technological advances and its ar- ticulation of a different concept of deter- rence do not point to an inevitable war. Nor does China's strategic modernisation. Intent is more difficult to gauge and both Russia and China are very skilled at con- ducting conflict at a level below the kinetic threshold. Their force developments give them the capability for intimidation, but it should be clear that such tactics are inher- ently risky. North Korea is a different case but it, too, appears willing to push the lim- its of threats and intimidation. In this context, NORAD's traditional missions of warning and attack assessment are as vital as ever and may be even more essential in situations where adversaries may be intent on signaling possibly hostile intentions but just short of outright war. The risk of accidental war in the era of "escalate to de-escalate" remains very sig- nificant. Canada has declared its intent to join in the NORAD modernisation effort; the viability of our defence relationship with the United States will depend upon assuming our national share of the burden and carrying forward NORAD's plans. This article contains excerpts from a paper (NORAD: Remaining Relevant) origi- nally published by the University of Cal- gary, School of Public Policy Publications in November 2019: http://www.policyschool. ca/publications/ Dr. Michael Dawson received his doctorate in European History from the University of Toronto. Aer joining the Canadian Foreign Service, he served abroad in New Delhi, Mos- cow, Washington DC and Colorado Springs, where he was Canadian Political Advisor to the US Commander of NORAD and US Northern Command. References 1. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2018. Missile Defense Project: "Missiles of Russia" Accessed July 1, 2019. https://missilethreat.CSIS.org 2. Jockel, Joseph. 2007. NORAD 1957- 2007: A History. Montreal and Kings- ton. McGill-Queen's University Press. 3. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. 2019. The Decline of Deterrence. Washington DC. The Hudson Institute. 4. Minister of National Defence. 2017. Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy. Ottawa. 5. North American Aerospace Defence Command. 2019. "NORAD Mis- sions." Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.norad.mil/About NORAD 6. Simmons, Ann. 2017. "Russia has been Assad's greatest ally- as it was to his father before him." Los Angeles Times, April 26. Accessed at https:// www.LAtimes.com/world/middlee- ast/la-fg-syria-russia-20170406-story. html. 7. SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. "Chapter 6: World Nuclear Forces." Accessed June 30, 2019. www.sipriyearbook.org 8. Stott, Michael. 2010. "Deadly new Russian weapon hides in shipping containers." Reuters, April 26, 2010. Accessed at https://www.reuters. com/article/US-russia-weapons- industrep2xb20100426. 9. Zysk, Katarzyna. 2018. "Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Military Strategy." The RUSI Journal, 163:2: 4-15. 10. https://doi.org/10.1080/030718 47.2018.1469267. Zysk is Head of Research and Deputy Director of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, part of the Norwegian De- fence University College, Oslo Royal Canadian Air Force CF-18 and United States Air Force F-16s participate in binational NORAD air defence exercise conducted over the Greater Toronto Area on July 30, 2020. PHOTO: NORAD

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