Vanguard Magazine

INNOVATION BY DENIS THOMPSON CANADA'S 21 st CENTURY ARMY Introduction Canada's extant defence policy, Strong, Se- cure, Engaged, mandates that the Canadi- an Armed Forces (CAF), and by extension the Canadian army, must be able to con- tribute to eight core missions 1 and operate across the spectrum of conflict including combat. Specifically: At one end of the spectrum are tradi- tional defence tasks. This includes working with allies and partners to prevent potential adversaries from causing harm and to deter hostile actions against Canada and its allies. It also involves being prepared to engage in combat if prevention and deterrence fail. 2 Without question, the most demanding mission is to "engage in combat." While the remaining missions are important, pro- fessional soldiers largely agree that an army capable of engaging in combat can cope with other missions. Any examination of the Canadian Army should therefore prior- itize the demands of high-intensity warfare to ensure that the entire menu of options on offer to the Canadian government is ex- ecutable. The war in Ukraine has brought into sharp focus the necessity for armies to be prepared for the developing realities of 21st century high-intensity conventional land warfare. While it is perhaps too early to harvest all the relevant lessons from the ongoing fight, some deductions cannot be ignored. The surprisingly inept Russian assault on Ukraine has highlighted many old combat truisms. Despite all the necessary tools at hand, the Russian Army has failed to assem- ble a combined arms effort to defeat a quan- titatively inferior Ukrainian Army. Images of armoured vehicle columns unsupported by infantry or close air support being sniped at by Ukrainian tank-hunting teams, suffering under artillery barrages directed from all manner of UAVs and falling prey to free- roaming loitering munitions, all indicate an army that has lost its ability to co-ordinate an all-arms advance. In short, the Russians are failing to synchronize all the elements necessary to succeed on today's complex battlefield and the Ukrainians are thwarting almost every ham-fisted advance with devas- tating counterpunches. Canadian Armed Forces soldiers conduct a Tube- Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided missile range during Exercise APOLLO VALIDATION, March 7 2022. Photo: DND Implications for Canada's Army Foremost, the army must nurture and grow its core war-fighting competencies if Canada wishes to make a meaningful con- tribution to a future coalition effort. 3 This is accomplished by deploying combined arms teams of infantry, armour (tanks), artillery, engineers, aviation and joint ca- pabilities. Joint capabilities can include close air support, naval support, electronic warfare, cyber-warfare and support from space-based systems, to name a few. Fortunately, the Canadian Army has long experience in combining the available capa- bilities (personnel, weapons and equipment) into cohesive mixed groupings and regularly trains at the combat team (100 to 200 sol- diers), battle group (600 to 1,200 soldiers) and brigade group (up to 6,000 soldiers) levels. These are precisely the groupings used when deploying on any international mission, including the current Canadian-led enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia (Operation REASSURANCE). 4 To keep pace with the evolving nature of conflict, Canadian combined arms group- www.vanguardcanada.com JUNE/JULY 2022 19 THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF CONVENTIONAL WAR

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