Vanguard Magazine

22OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2024 www.vanguardcanada.com A N U C L E A R S U B M A R I N E achieving the permitting and political support needed to actually build these fa- cilities in time to replace the Victoria-class submarines. It is important to understand that the in- frastructure associated with nuclear-pow- ered submarines goes beyond jetties and warehouses. These vessels require consid- erable support to safely maintain and, if necessary, refuel reactors. 14 Modern US Navy reactors use pressurized light-water reactors (PWR) with highly enriched ura- nium that provides a core-life lasting the entire service life of the submarine. The French, however, chose low enriched ura- nium in their reactor, which means they must be refuelled every ten years. There- fore, a French-designed Canadian naval re- actor would need that refueling infrastruc- ture, which is both complex and expensive. Moreover, a clear understanding of costs is important to gaining and maintaining public support – and this is not something that Canada has been adept at, when com- municating defence related procurement to the public. In particular, media reporting tends to quote questionable open-source submarine "sail away" costs and not the total cost of the project that is required by Treasury Board. The reality is that buying a submarine is not at all like buying a car. It is more than the production cost of the ve- hicle; it is also the cost of buying an entirely new garage and service centre – while also convincing the people on whose land you are building it that it's a good idea. Disposal Before embarking on the acquisition of nu- clear-powered submarines, a country must have a disposal plan for the submarines at the end of their service life. Looking at the UK today, all their decommissioned nu- clear submarines remain alongside await- ing disposal and are only now starting to be recycled. 15 Notably the cost to safely store these submarines while awaiting final disposal is significant. 16 The issue is more than the storage of nuclear waste (expend- ed fuel), 17 it is also the reactor compart- ments themselves. The US Navy recycles decommissioned nuclear vessels at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard by defueling the reactor and sending the spent nuclear fuel to the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho for processing. It then cuts out the actual reactor compartment which is then stored in an above ground facility in Hanford in Washington state. 18 This is a multi-billion- dollar effort. Indeed, disposal plans were a significant issue with environmental groups in the late 1980s during the short- lived Canadian SSN project and this will have only become more difficult to man- age today. Building the Submarines Building an SSN is an extraordinarily dif- ficult and complex process. Unlike surface vessels, it cannot reasonably be done in Canada and our allies have little spare build capacity. Currently, the US, the UK, and the French are all simultaneously rebuild- ing both their attack and ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleets. In many cases, the national shipbuilders are years behind schedule and unable to fill even their own navies' orders. In 2024, the US Navy has a stated requirement for 66 SSNs, however, with only 48 currently in commission and current production producing less than two SSNs per year, there is inadequate ca- pacity to meet national demands – this will not change any time soon. 19 This is the co- nundrum the Australians are facing in the replacement of their Collins-class conven- tional submarines, challenging the popu- lar misconception that the Americans can quickly ramp up SSN production to meet increased AUKUS demand. Yet there is a huge difference in build- ing components (including torpedo tubes and outer hull sections) and building en- tire submarines. Submarine building yards are special compared to other shipyards, including those building warships. Canada has done a good job through the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) of rebuilding its shipyards to construct surface warships. Yet, that success is illustrative of the effort and time that this entails. The NSS has been a multi-decade process and is still not at full strength. Attempting to establish a new NSS for far more complex nuclear- submarine yards would be a generational undertaking and far from a certain success. In short, whatever industrial expertise that Canada once had in submarine construc- tion no longer exists and is not an expertise that can be rebuilt quickly or easily. This is the main reason that the current Canadian Patrol Submarine Project is looking to a foreign yard to build the next generation of conventional submarines for Canada. People The Royal Canadian Navy's most critical deficiency today is not equipment, but people. Specialized occupations, both of- ficer and NCM, are significantly below authorized strength and nuclear certifica- tion is a lengthy process. In addition to training and education, what is often not mentioned is the challenge of recruiting sufficient submariners, as there is a sig- nificant increase in the size of submarine crews associated with nuclear propulsion. Similar to Canada, the Australians are op- erating conventional submarines (with a crew of 48 personnel), which will have to increase considerably for an AUKUS SSN, as a British Astute-class SSN crew is 95 and a larger American Virginia-class SSN crew is 130. Notably, the future Canadian pa- trol submarine project is looking to reduce the current Victoria-class submarine crew size- not increase it. With regards to nuclear propulsion cer- tification, as the Australians are seeing now with AUKUS, it will take the better part of 20 years to generate the initial subma- rine crews and support facilities with fully trained, educated, and certified personnel. For Canada, even this multi-decade effort would be uncertain, as it would require the total support of the foreign nation supply- ing the submarines. This process means building more than crews and supporting military personnel; it includes the entire submarine human resource network. This would include support personnel, mainte- nance, safety technicians, and contractors. Moreover, once the SSN bases are estab- lished, they are likely to be remote – result- ing in similar personnel posting issues that are currently being experienced by the Roy- al Canadian Air Force at CFB Cold Lake in northern Alberta. For a military that is al- ready finding it difficult to recruit and retain uniquely skilled personnel, a lengthy post- ing to a remote base, far from the comforts of urban life, will not be attractive. Conclusions Nuclear-powered attack submarines have a great deal to offer and, in an ideal world, they would be the best solution for the Ca- nadian Navy. Yet, the near-insurmountable challenges surrounding their acquisition and operation must be understood and respected. The costs to acquire, operate, maintain and dispose of this capability is staggering. Because of this, it is also a capa- bility that would be far too tempting to dis- card should political or economic circum- stance change. As was stated in the recent Naval Association of Canada report "Cana- da in Extremis – Rebalancing the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Navy": a programme of this magnitude "would re-

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