Vanguard Magazine

A N U C L E A R S U B M A R I N E www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2024 23 quire continuous political support, span- ning many governments." 20 Can this be done? Yes, but until such time as Canadians have an epiphany on defence spending, a Canadian nuclear powered submarine capa- bility will remain unaffordable and probably politically impossible to implement. Embarking on an SSN project would also drag down the RCNs current conven- tional submarine replacement program. With time, money, and political capital wasted on a quixotic quest for SSNs the current efforts to find a realistic subma- rine replacement would be sidelined and probably lost following the failure of the more ambitious program. The Mulroney government's decision to cancel the con- ventional submarine project, as well as the last batch of patrol frigates, in favour of an SSN fleet in the 1980s is a good example of that thinking. The failure to acquire SSNs meant that the navy lost a significant portion of the required surface fleet and was forced to make do with a smaller num- ber of conventional submarines, which are ill-suited to Canada's requirements. In ev- ery respect, the search for a nuclear option is a case of the perfect being the enemy of the good. Instead, Canadians need to accept the realities of nuclear submarine ownership and move on with the immediate replace- ment of the Victoria-class submarines. Far from a second-tier capability, modern con- ventional submarines are extremely capa- ble and offer the RCN strategic capabilities for defence, surveillance, and global warf- ighting, in partnership with the US Navy's SSNs they would make a formidable team in the defence of North America and inter- national allies. Reprinted with permission, Starshell Summer 2024, www.navalassoc.ca References: 1. On July 10, 2024, during the 2024 NATO summit, there was a subse- quent announcement on the subma- rine replacement project by the Min- ister of National Defence clarifying that Canada was launching a process to acquire up to 12 conventionally powered submarines. Government of Canada, News Release, "Canada launching process to acquire up to 12 conventionally-powered submarines" (July 10, 2024). 2. Department of National Defence, Our North Strong and Free (April 2024). 3. Danielle Bochove, "Canada Readies New Arctic Foreign Policy as Russia Threat Looms," Bloomberg (June12, 2024). 4. David Pugliese, "Royal Canadian Navy not considering nuclear-pow- ered subs despite Trudeau claim," Ottawa Citizen (May 29, 2024). 5. Jason Delaney, "The One Class of Vessel that is Impossible to Build in Canada" The Northern Mariner 3-4 (July and October 2014) 6. Peter Kenter, "Canada has a respon- sibility to safely manage nuclear waste for generations – here's the plan," National Post (November 25, 2022). 7. AUKUS Pillar 1 is the sharing of nuclear submarine technology. 8. Allan Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries 1981-1989 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2006), 470. 9. The loss of the nuclear-powered submarines USS Thresher in 1963 and USS Scorpion in 1968 were the result of factors not associated with the nuclear propulsion. See: Bruce Rule, Why the USS Thresher (SSN 593) Was Lost, (Nimble Books LLC, 2017) and Why the USS Scorpion (SSN 589) Was Lost, (Nimble Books LLC, 2011). 10. At this time, the US Navy is operat- ing approximately 97 reactors, which includes 11 aircraft carriers with two reactors each and approximately 67 submarines and five R&D and train- ing platforms (including moored training submarines) with one reactor reach. They also have shore facili- ties for technology development and training naval nuclear power opera- tors. Therefore, it is difficult to say exactly how many reactors the US Navy is operating at any one time as once a ship is decommissioned, the reactors still exist, and the recycling programme is lengthy. To give an idea of the some of the costs of maintain- ing a naval nuclear infrastructure in FY 2023 US Congressional Budget Justification for naval nuclear reactors asked for $2.1B USD for FY 2023 but also anticipated outyear funding of $7.6 B USD from FY 2024-2027. Of note there is also the Dept of Energy Working Capital Fund of which Naval Reactors' contribution in FY 2023 was $2.5B. Rough calculation is that for 97 reactors, supported by a long- standing infrastructure, the FY 2023 Congressional ask was just short of $5B USD, with major increases antici- pated. That is about $50M USD per operating reactor assuming you have a mature infrastructure in place, which Canada does not. Also noting with more reactors operating, the more the overall maintenance costs can be amortized over – a small number of Canadian naval reactors, supported on both coasts, would assuredly be more expensive per reactor than that of the US Navy model. See: US Department of Energy, "Naval Reactors: Proposed Appropriations Language"(2023). 11. The 1958 agreement between the US and the UK bars the transfer of nuclear technology to a third country. Also, the 1959 agreement between Canada and the US bars Canada from receiving nuclear technology from a third nation. See: Theodore Guillory, Canada: The Decision to Procure Nuclear Attack Submarines and its Significance for NATO, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School (September 1988), 48-49. 12. Both the Americans and the French use pressurized light water reactors (PWR) which are fundamentally dif- ferent than the Canadian CANDU reactor which is a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR). 13. Australia Ministry of Defence, "Press Conference, HMAS Stirling, WA" (March 22, 2024). 14. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Refueling PWR." 15. "Project to dismantle ex-Royal Navy nuclear submarines inches forward," Navy Lookout (February 7, 2024) 16. According to the UK National Ac- counting Office (NAO) in 2019, the Currently, the US, the UK, and the French are all simultaneously rebuilding both their attack and ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleets. In many cases, the national shipbuilders are years behind schedule and unable to fill even their own navies' orders.

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