Vanguard Magazine

A I R D E F E N C E www.vanguardcanada.com JUNE/JULY 2026 19 degrees of complexity and size requiring BMC3I, in particular Air Command and Control (Air C2) capabilities that can be both forward-deployed, employed, and sustained wherever and whenever re- quired. The development, implementation and employment of the Air C2 capabil- ity must aim to ensure synergy between centralized control, allowing for strategic and operational direction and allocation of resources, and decentralized execution, al- lowing for flexible and responsive actions at tactical levels. Network centric operations and infor- mation sharing are essential to achieving a common operational picture and enhanced situational awareness. The Air C2 capabil- ity must be able to facilitate seamless inte- gration of sensors, operators and decision- makers across multiple structures, forces and platforms. The Air C2 construct must also be designed with resilience and redun- dancy to withstand disruption or attack. Active Air and Missile Defence IAMD has to include a comprehensive ap- proach that combines various systems and technologies, able to operate at different ranges and altitudes, in order to provide a layered defence against all types of air and missile threats, thus increasing the overall effectiveness of defence by providing re- dundancy and improving the probability of successful interceptions. The threat now posed by the Class 1 unmanned systems with a mass lower than 150 kg presents yet another set of chal- lenges to operate in a multi-domain en- vironment, within both domestic and de- ployed operating environments. Active air and missile defence comprises the mission areas of airborne and surface- based IAMD, supported by other avail- able means as appropriate. Any IAMD approach must be capable of executing both airborne air defence and ground or sea-based air and missile defence activi- ties simultaneously, employing a modular, adaptable and reconfigurable mix of air- borne and surface-based platforms. Airborne defence requires assets with an all-weather, day or night capability. In ad- dition, enabling capabilities such as elec- tronic warfare, airborne early warning and control systems and air-to-air refuelling are required to enhance the overall effective- ness and flexibility of these defences. Surface-based IAMD requires a mix of short, medium and long-range systems, ground-based or maritime-based, able to provide mutual and complementary sup- port to mitigate the limitations of each system defence, and aiming to create a multi-layered defence that can address var- ious types of air and missile threats, from small, low and slow-flying UAS to all types of cruise and ballistic missiles, including hypersonics. Patriot air and missile defence system. Photo: NATO AIRCOM Operation CADENCE, the TPS-77 Tactical Control Radar system. Photo: MCpl Steeve Picard, DND Passive Air and Missile Defence Passive air and missile defence measures must also be in place in order to minimize the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to air and missile threats, as a complement to active measures. Passive air and missile defence measures include, but are not limited to, hardening and protection, camouflage, concealment, dispersion and redundancy features. A broad and systemic perspective needs to be adopted as regards the potential passive air and missile defence measures for any na- tion's critical infrastructure and assets, by considering resilience as a whole and not just the survivability of separate key ele- ments. An Integrated Air and Missile Defence for Canada Efforts already underway in NORAD Modernization mirror this NATO policy construct as evidenced by projects such as Over The Horizon Radar (OTHR), Air- borne Early Warning (AEW), Enhanced Satellite Communications Project Polar (ESCP-P), Future Combined Air Opera- tions Centre Capability (FCC) and Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) projects hope- fully all being brought together in a multi- domain approach that integrates capabili- ties from all domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyber. The variety, complexity and potential volume of the threats necessitate a command-and-control system that lever- ages advanced capabilities, such as cloud architecture and AI, to facilitate seam- less integration of sensors, effectors and decision-making processes across multiple structures, forces and platforms. Achieving an effective IAMD is as much about data integration as it is about the various active platforms being used. It also mandates con- tinued close coordination and integration with the US given the 360-degree nature of the threats. Crucially, as recognized by the Government of Canada in 2025, this must also include Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) if it is to be effective. Designing and building an improved IAMD in Canada requires a clear assess- ment of what it is that needs to be defend- ed. This is defined as the Critical Asset List (CAL) which includes key infrastructure, facilities and resources that must be pro- tected due to their strategic importance. While it includes traditional military in- frastructure such as basing and command and control nodes, it also includes port fa- cilities, power generation facilities, energy

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