Vanguard Magazine

I IDEAS www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2015 37 survives to this day. Adherents will lov- ingly proclaim all the wondrous things the Arrow might have become. Glossed over is the exorbitant cost, the specifica- tion to use an unproven weapon system, the small numbers required for Canadian service and the simple fact that Arrow was not as unique a legend as you would believe. Several U.S. and British designs closely mirror, or exceed, the perfor- mance of Arrow. All suffered cancellation in one phase of development or another. Cost of development, as well as chang- ing priorities, would be a factor in all those cancellations. It is worthy to note that another famous aircraft would fly shortly before the Arrow was cancelled, the McDonnell F4H-1 Phantom II. See- ing service as the F-4, the Phantom II was more of a generalist. It saw service as fighter, fighter-bomber, jamming aircraft, photoreconnaissance aircraft and as an air-defence interceptor. Iranian Air Force Phantom II aircraft have recently been seen striking ISIS targets. The generalist long outlived its specialist sister. Over specification, and the added ac- quisition costs it entails, does not end at acquisition, it also brings higher life cycle costs as well. When a nation pays exorbi- tant amounts of money for a capability, they want to ensure that it remains in ser- vice as long as possible and that it remains relevant. This leads to costly update pro- grams that may actually consume a signifi- cant fraction of the costs of a more modest replacement. Some would argue that our military must always have the bleeding-edge very best available. It is an understandable sentiment. No one wants our forces to suffer needless casualties. We tend to forget though, that the delay inherent in fielding the very best also causes casual- ties. The troops can only use what they have, not the new super equipment that exists only as programs and promises. In the words of Robert Watson-Watt, "Give them the third best to go on with; the second best comes too late, the best never comes." His wartime work on RA- DAR required such urgency. We have time to wait on second best, to take the 80% solution. We are learning, at great ex- pense, that he was right that the best never comes. We tend to forget though, that the delay inherent in fielding the very best also causes casualties. Canadians like to think that the Avro Arrow was the best aircra ever designed. Unfor- tunately, the way it's remembered isn't as close to reality as we think. There were similar designs to the Arrow, and some claimed better performance.

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