Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/742410
38 ocToBER/NoVEMBER 2016 www.vanguardcanada.com D Defence policy confronting incursions against Canada's sovereignty. These ships will also play an important part in developing Canada's High North in the coming decades, a process that will be conducted largely by air and from the sea. Future joint and maritime operations in the Arctic will hinge upon the continued development of a constellation of unmanned, semi- autonomous and remotely-operated intelligence, reconnaissance and surveil- lance (ISR) systems, such as those being explored by Canada, Norway and the United States. • Better equipped to conduct peace sup- port operations. Recent operations by the RCN as well as allied navies have un- derscored a pressing need for the CAF to acquire a dedicated peace support ship, specifically to meet the unique de- mands of humanitarian assistance and di- saster relief (HA/DR) operations. Such operations typically unfold in chaotic conditions, often in the absence of, or hampered by extensively damaged, trans- portation networks and infrastructure. The characteristics that would permit such a ship to act as a seabase include: a substantial sealift capacity to embark personnel, vehicles, force logistics and humanitarian materiel for transport into theatre; equipment to embark/disem- bark cargo as well as transfer cargo at sea; deck space to accommodate or operate medium or heavy lift aircraft and landing craft to act as the ship/shore connectors to project, sustain and support a force ashore, as well as to recover it; and the internal space that can be dedicated to a joint headquarters, civil-military coor- dination centre, and medical and dental facilities and accommodations for evacu- ees. Such a vessel would likely be among the most heavily utilized assets in the future CAF inventory. Capable of anticipatory pre-positioning or rapid deployment, a peace support ship would be an ideal platform for joint action across a range of relatively permissive scenarios. Such scenarios would include the evacuation of non-combatants from zones of incipi- ent conflict, as well as support to forces ashore during a post-conflict recovery or stabilization period. Moreover, such a vessel would likely emerge as the CAF's principal defence diplomacy asset, deployed routinely to regions of strategic interest to Canada with a range of personnel and joint capa- bilities embarked to strengthen regional capacities and strategic partnerships, or more broadly to conduct goodwill mis- sions with other federal agencies and nongovernmental organizations and as- sets embarked. • Better equipped to contribute to joint action ashore, through the acquisition of weapons designed for precision op- erational or tactical fires in support of a joint force, as well as systems for theatre- level air defence to permit the protection of joint forces and populations ashore from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The latter capability would also be especially pertinent for the strategic North American defence partnership, as it would represent a major step-change in Canada's capacity to contribute to NORAD and would likely encompass significant changes to current bi-national command arrangements. DeLIVeRInG TOMORROW'S nAVY Today's maritime forces are the result of investments made by governments prior to 1993, when defence spending equated to 1.8 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or higher. The modernization or replacement of those assets was advanced with considerable difficulty when defence spending fell to an average of 1.1 per cent of GDP. The ability of future governments to continue leveraging these prior invest- ments, in terms of current policy-directed defence outcomes, is rapidly drawing to a close. There is simply no question more fundamental to the success of the De- fence Policy Review (DPR) than to bring expected defence outcomes and spending levels into balance in the long term. The recommendations offered below recognize that it will take more than a decade to achieve a new balance. Accord- ingly, this paper advocates the sequenc- ing of additional investments in the near to mid-term through modest adjustments involving public/private partnerships and a reprofiling of fleet renewal by extending the life of the RCN's current generation of patrol ships and in particular its subma- rines. In this vein, the government should: • Continue efforts to accelerate the RCN's recapitalization, consistent with the need for robust requirements definition to reduce strategic risks, while retaining the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) as the most assured ba- sis of recapitalizing the fleet. The costs of such an approach compare favourably to offshore production, especially in light of the strategic advantages that accrue from a robust domestic industrial base. • Use public/private partnering as a com- plementary activity to the NSPS, where requirements can be met through vessels built to modern commercial standards. Such an approach, already in place to acquire an interim AOR for the RCN in 2017, holds promise for the potential acquisition of a purpose-converted peace support ship, described earlier, as well as the acquisition of a new generation of coastal patrol ships to replace the Kings- ton-class Maritime Coastal Defence Ves- sels (MCDVs). • Increase funding for fleet maintenance (DND's national procurement account). Aging hulls need enhanced levels of deep maintenance, and recurring shortfalls in relation to demand have incrementally led to growing liabilities that will need to be addressed, especially in relation to the life extension proposals that follow. • Extend the life of the Victoria-class sub- marines and the Kingston-class MCDVs as a means of retaining fleet capacity while the RCN undergoes the transition from the modernized Halifax-class frig- ates from the mid-2020s through the mid-2030s. • Plan to replace the Aurora Maritime Pa- trol Aircraft and Victoria-class subma- rines. Serge Bertrand served in the canadian Armed Forces for nearly four decades. Before retiring in 2015, he served as an advisor to several successive commanders of the Royal canadian Navy. This article was previously published by the canadian Global Affairs institute Maritime commerce touches daily on canadians' lives.