Vanguard Magazine

c cYBer WAR www.vanguardcanada.com DECEMBER 2016/JANUARY 2017 13 borders, to attain a political goal or com- municate a political message through fear or intimidation of non-combatant persons or the general public. • Cyber War: disrupting or destroying in- formation and communications systems with the intent of causing catastrophic damage and destruction of critical infra- structure, in the same league as bombs and bullets. The term cyber attack is an umbrella term often used to include all of the exploita- tions above. The word 'attack' carries a lot of baggage with it. Generally, it implies the destruction of material and/or people, and it could be construed to be an act of war. Consequently, the term cyber attack would be more accurately used to describe only those exploitations in support of a cy- ber war. Another term for such exploitations is network warfare operations. The term cyber exploitations is the more accurate umbrella term for all other exploitations enumerated above. The government of Canada has responded to cyber exploita- tions with its Cyber Security Strategy. Published in 2010, the strategy is note- worthy for the fact that it limits itself to strengthening the government's capability to detect, deter and defend against cyber attacks while deploying cyber technology to advance Canada's economic and nation- al security interests. It did not militarize cyber security; it was limited to specifying that the Canadian Armed Forces were to strengthen their ca- pacity to defend their own networks, work with other government departments to identify threats to their networks and pos- sible responses, and continue to exchange information about best cyber practices with allied militaries. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces were also to work with allies to develop the policy and legal framework for military aspects of cyber security, complementing inter- national outreach efforts of Global Affairs Canada. It is noteworthy that cyber attacks were not on the table. Some may have despaired of this approach believing the best defence to be a good offence. There are several reasons why a more aggressive approach would have been ill- advised in 2010, in that cyber defence was the focus and the concept of cyber war had not yet sufficiently matured: • By militarizing relatively low-level cyber threats, governments risk desensitizing the citizenry thereby creating a type of 'moral hazard,' which makes ordinary people and companies less likely to take responsibility for protecting themselves. That is exactly the opposite of the sort of behaviour a responsible government should want to encourage. • Furthermore, one risks negating other "longer-term and more sustainable ef- forts" to address the new challenges that cyber brings to security systems. • Finally, one risks creating the impres- sion that one is in a constant state of war where cyber is concerned, but with little evidence of damage or impact on citizens personally which might thereby engender cynicism and complacency. What has changed since 2010 such that Can- ada should revisit its 2010 cyber strategy? To answer that question let us return to our discussion of cyberspace. Many consider cyberspace to be the newest and most important addition to the global commons, which comprises four domains: maritime, air, space and now cyber. Cyberspace is now used by a quarter of the world's population, and that number continues to expand. It has "be- come the centre of gravity of the global- ized world, and for nations, the centre of gravity for all aspects of national activity, to include economic, financial, diplomatic, and other transactions including military operations." In essence, digitization is now so per- vasive that cyberspace is indispensable for transportation systems, electrical transmis- sion grids, weapons systems, command and control systems, inter alia. It is, there- fore, a very real concern that successful cy- ber attacks within cyberspace would have disastrous effects on the ability of states to function. Consequently, cyberspace has become an emerging theatre of operations and all states must be capable of operat- ing therein. According to Fred Schreier, "[s]uccessful exploitation of this domain through network warfare operations could allow an opponent to dominate or hold at risk any or all of the global commons." Harking back to the characteristics of cy- berspace highlighted earlier, it is a domain where the classic restraints of distance, space, time and investment are reduced, sometimes dramatically, both for us and for potential enemies. Power based on information resources is not new; cyber power is. As Kuehl de- fines it, "[c]yberpower is the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influ- ence events in other operational environ- ments and across the instruments of pow- er." Franklin Kramer defines it as "the use, threatened use, or effect by the knowledge of its potential use, of disruptive cyber attack capabilities by a state." And Sch- reier argues that cyber power capabilities challenge the strategist to integrate those capabilities with other elements and in- struments of power. And this requires the crafting of a cyber strategy, which is "the development and employment of capabilities to operate in cyberspace, in- tegrated and coordinated with the other operational realms, to achieve or support the achievement of objectives across the elements of national power. To develop a national strategy for cyberspace, therefore, is simultaneous to creating cyber resources and procedures that can contribute to the achievement of specific national security objectives. Cyber war means disrupting or destroying information and communica-

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