MENTORING M
What complicates the matter is the news coverage of the
immediate future and the focus on 2014. What does the date mean? Are all or most of the coalition forces leaving then? Will the financial support suddenly cease? To what extent are this government and its military expected to fend for themselves? No one really knows. Plans have not yet been clearly laid out. Many of us on the ground believe coalition forces must remain past 2014 even if not in the current strength. A new republic trying to govern itself with a 70 percent il- literacy rate will need a transitional safety net until the younger leaders advance to higher positions of authority. Yes, the Afghan National Army and the police will need to take an ever-increasing role in providing the security and stemming the insurgency, but they cannot be abandoned abruptly. That transition is not without real and significant challenges, not the least of which are residual corruption, lingering comfort with the Soviet-style command centric direction in the ANA, and ingrained inertia.
My perspective is that of a logistics Major whose primary respon-
sibility is to advise the Afghan officer (G4) responsible for the lo- gistics for the Kabul Military Training Center. KMTC trains up to 60,000 recruits a year – that is the size of the entire Canadian military. The volume of supply and support required to do this is at a scale that perhaps even the Canadian Forces would struggle with. That is why I am concerned that the current logistics support
system may very well not be ready for the Afghan lead in 2014. I am reminded of the old military adage: For want of a nail the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. For want of a horse the rider was lost. For want of a rider the message was lost. For want of a message the battle was lost. For want of a battle the kingdom was lost. And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
So as I ponder the aftermath of 2014, I hope I am not predict- ing the complete collapse of the current fragile government of Afghanistan, but a breakdown in the ANA's logistics system could have far-reaching consequences.
www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2012 41
