Vanguard Magazine

M MENTORING Consider this: What if the logistics system cannot provide the equipment needed on time for the ANA to successfully continue fighting the insurgents? What happens when the soldiers stop get- ting paid regularly? What happens when they stop getting fed ev- ery day? The answer likely is the mass exodus of the soldiers from the army. True, a well-trained army will follow a good leader through a lot. The camaraderie built when facing huge challenges can cause soldiers to band together. But when we are talking about logistics, we are focusing on basic needs. Without food, pay and equip- ment, soldiers will question the worthiness of their cause and be- gin to doubt their leadership. Virtually all governments – especially in potentially unstable en- vironments – rely on their military power to maintain authority over the governed. This can be through fear or trust, depend- ing on how public consensus views the army. But if the army no longer provides that governing foundation, if the soldiers have started a mass exodus, the resulting vacuum will be filled by oth- ers with power. This was evident when the Taliban managed to fill the power void in the 1990s. Coalition and Afghan forces have weakened the insurgency drastically, but one cannot be certain they, with help from other nations, do not have access to sufficient resources and people to topple a government that has lost its military base. To shore up the logistic system in the ANA, the three challenges must be addressed. In rooting out corruption, we have to acknowledge two fun- damental truths. First, given the extreme poverty of Afghanistan, many here have grown up with a survival-of-the-fittest mentality that prompts them to look out for themselves and their family above any kind of western norm frowning on corruption. Sec- ond, things western nations view as corruption are not necessarily viewed that way here. For example, the Persian word Baksheesh is a term used to de- scribe tipping, charitable giving, as well as certain forms of politi- cal corruption and bribery in the Middle East to South Asia. In the view of some here, the personal payment in exchange for a favorable decision is akin to the western view of tipping a waiter or waitress for good service. But in the army, this can have significant negative consequences. Some of the money that is siphoned off comes from the soldiers themselves, either in the form of pay distribution, cost of pro- motion or surcharges on items sold in the soldiers' canteen. If soldiers see this and see their leaders profiting at the expense of their subordinates, the resulting weakening of the chain of com- mand would be obvious in any army. Certainly, this cannot be overlooked as a potential factor in the 30 percent attrition rate in the ANA. Further complicating this is a command-focused army. Keep in mind, the army here has had more than half a century of learning the Soviet way of running a military. The concept of a noncom- missioned officer and delegation of responsibilities are new con- cepts introduced within the past 10 years. For things to get ac- complished, often a command directive is necessary by someone up the chain of command (CoC). A kind of military inertia sets 42 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2012 www.vanguardcanada.com Orthopaedic Surgeon Lieutenant-Commander Kirk Sundby examines an x-ray with his Afghan National Army counterparts. Photo: MCp. Cless Howse in. Inaction (unless commanded) combined with poor motivation (unless there is a benefit) comes across to a western view point as a lack of initiative. Armies will stagnate and not progress without change and the willingness to change comes from initiative. This highly command centric system regularly causes their sup- ply request to be crippled. Every layer of command seems to feel the need to sign off on the issuing of kit, equipment and supplies. The consequence is that simple supply requests can take upwards of two to four months to flow through all the authorities to ob- tain signatures. In time, the system will smooth itself out and a comfort level will be established in the supply process. But if the ANA is forced to implement the system fully within the next two years, there is little reason for optimism. In the final analysis, it really does come down to the willingness of the Afghans themselves to re-adjust to the path upon which they were traveling and the willingness of the rest of the world to provide time for the Afghans to make the adjustments free from tyrannical interference. We do hear the leadership in the ANA saying the right things in front of large crowds of soldiers, statements like "the ANA is leading the country as an example of unity. KMTC is a place where the door opens to represent all people of Afghanistan," "soldiers come first and are the priority over leadership," and "ac- countability of kit and equipment is essential for future success in the Army." So in spite of the dire headlines and the media's "2014 Sword of Damocles" hanging over Afghanistan, there remains the basis for optimism. On a day-to-day basis I observe encouraging actions taken by members of the ANA. I have seen the logistics staff held accountable for poor performance and recognized in front of the group for doing good work. I have seen them discipline those who are guilty of corruption. The ANA at KMTC have the experience to produce trained soldiers prepared for what they may face against the insurgency. The key is to ensure they have what they need to do the job and the time in which to accomplish the job unmolested.

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