Vanguard Magazine

16 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2018 www.vanguardcanada.com C4isr containment, continuity and recovery ac- tivity costs, resource replacement costs, opportunity costs, penalty costs, and any loss induced by secondary effects. Benefit shortfalls are based on key performance indi- cators (KPIs) selected to reflect mission out- comes. With analytics, formal relationships can be established between impact severity measures and cost-benefit loss magnitude. These functions can be used, with the dis- ruption frequency and severity distributions discussed previously, to simulate plausible future scenarios over a relevant planning ho- rizon (e.g. three years). The risk exposure distribution shown in Fig. 4 is derived by simulating a large sample of scenarios. MA solutions profile incident and disrup- tion patterns and, consequently, DESs risk exposure distributions. Hence, altering a DES design or MA solutions has a direct effect on the DES risk exposure. Comparing candidate MA solutions The development of a DES involves the comparison of alternative designs or can- didate MA solutions. When any MA solu- tion is changed, the DES risk exposure is also altered. Candidate solutions have, on one side, differing investment or leasing cashflows and, on the other side, differing value loss exposure distributions. One ends up comparing relatively predictable cash- flows with probabilistic costs and benefit shortfalls. This is a complex problem to which analytics can contribute. Graphical decision aids can, for instance, be used to reveal fundamental tradeoffs. For exam- ple, the plot in Fig. 5 compares the risk exposure of an As-Is DES with its revised exposure under two MA solution modi- fication options. A framework of the type presented here was elaborated by the Australian Armed Forces to analyze cyber capability options (see Rowe et al., Prioritizing investment in military cyber capability using risk analysis, JDMS, May 2017). The CAF could take advantage of the generic approach intro- duced in this text to enhance mission as- surance in its DES development and im- provement projects. The views expressed in this text are those of the authors and not that of the CAF or the government of Canada. Alain Martel is a Professor Emeritus at Université Laval, Québec, Canada Sophie Martel is a Master of Engineering, Canadian Forces' Decoration (CD), Gatin- eau, Canada Figure 4: Mission Assurance Framework Figure 5: Box-and-Whisker Plot KPI Shortfall (Annual Cost) As-Is Option 1 Option 2 0.1-frac�le 0.9-frac�le Min Max Mean Loss Distribu�on Sta�s�cs: MA Capabilities SHAPE: Act on threat-agent motivations or on hazard-surge driving forces to eliminate risk sources (e.g. negotiate a treaty with an adversary, adopt a formal enterprise ar- chitecture approach to avoid failed designs and construction errors) DETER: Discourage, complicate, delay or reduce the occurrence of dangerous incidents and the emergence of incapacities (e.g. raise perceptions of DES detection and reprisal capabilities, do preventive maintenance) PROTECT: Detect incidents/incapacities, provide early warning, block/escape/prepare before a hit, and safeguard the DES when hit, thus reducing penetration probability and impact severity (e.g. perform regular audits/tests, implement rigorous access control to prevent intrusions, protect data) RESPOND: Detect/assess disruptions, contain damages, provide emergency sup- port, continue MEFs, restore the system to its normal state, and punish offenders (e.g. shi to alternative operating mode, trigger recovery process, activate standing recourse agreements) EVOLVE: A posteriori, investigate disrup- tions and responses to validate the current MA process, synthetize lessons learned, follow-up to reduce vulnerabilities and improve MA capabilities, and report to stakeholders

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