Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/274231
the Canadian Surface Combatant? M MaritiMe 36 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2014 www.vanguardcanada.com t he National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS), a $38.3 billion program to renew the aging fleets of the Royal Canadian Navy and Canadian Coast Guard, is designed to meet a multitude of federal gov- ernment needs. These include sovereignty projection, participa- tion in international coalitions and meeting international commit- ments, and ensuring respect for Canadian law in our own waters. The NSPS, however, is also becoming an action plan for eco- nomic investment. One of the strategy's commitments to the Canadian shipbuild- ing industry is to build the vessels in Canada. This commitment wants to relegate the old "boom and bust" cycle to the scrap heap by ensuring a sustainable shipbuilding program of steady work that allows the yards to retain an experienced workforce (a struggle in the past) while providing the RCN and CCG with the vessels they need to do their missions. In short, NSPS will be the biggest defence program in Canadian history. To ensure full value for taxpayer dollars, a "best value" procurement approach has been touted by the government as the preferred approach to this program. When Irving Shipbuilding won the combatant package and Sea- span Shipyards won the non-combatant package, they agreed to not only spend their own resources to upgrade their facilities, they also committed to national "value propositions." This included ensuring a sustainable marine industry – leading many to assume other smaller shipyards would also benefit from the down flow of these large programs, and that workers would receive training and incentives to enter the workforce. Interestingly, the competition did not include a cost evaluation. The crown jewel of the NSPS is the Canadian Surface Combat- ant, a project valued at $26 billion for 15 ships that are expected to be the new workhorses of the RCN. The CSC is intended to replace three Iroquois-class destroyers long past their expected service life and a fleet of 12 Halifax-class frigates to be retired by the end of next decade. The new fleet would become the major surface component of maritime combat power for Canada, op- erating independently or as part of a Canadian Task Group to provide the government a range of options for any number of maritime missions. Amidst the recent federal budget announcements, including the Louise Mercier is a senior defence procurement associate with Hill & Knowlton. deferral of $3 billion, questions swirl about the impact on the NSPS and what it might mean to shipbuilding programs. To date, there appear to be no direct effects, although the CSC program has landed squarely in the bulls eye of the new Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC)-led Defence Procurement Strat- egy, which outlines new industrial requirements and enhanced value propositions for economic development. So what does "best value" mean to the various stakeholders in the NSPS process? And, for the purposes of this article, what does best value mean for the construction of the CSC, the centerpiece of the NSPS program? For the RCN, the end user of the CSC, best value might mean the most replacement vessels possible for their very specific re- quirements. The navy has developed a Statement of Operational Requirements which they will expect industry to achieve. It will require cost-benefit tradeoffs during the design cycle whereby the RCN and the government, leveraging the shipyard (Irving) and the ship designer, will help get the most "bang for the buck," What is best value for